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Abstract
This conversational-style essay is an exchange among fourteen
professors—representing thirteen universities across five
countries—with experience teaching with feminist judgments.
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Crawford (1936-2019), two proud supporters of the feminist judgments projects.
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Feminist judgments are ‘shadow’ court decisions rewritten from a
feminist perspective, using only the precedent in effect and the facts
known at the time of the original decision. Scholars in Canada,
England, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, Ireland,
India, and Mexico have published (or are currently producing)
written collections of feminist judgments that demonstrate how
feminist perspectives could have changed the legal reasoning or
outcome (or both) in important legal cases.
This essay begins to explore the vast pedagogical potential of
feminist judgments. The contributors to this conversation describe
how they use feminist judgments in the classroom; how students
have responded to the judgments; how the professors achieve
specific learning objectives through teaching with feminist
judgments; and how working with feminist judgments—whether
studying them, writing them, or both—can help students excavate
the multiple social, political, economic, and even personal factors
that influence the development of legal rules, structures, and
institutions. The primary takeaway of the essay is that feminist
judgments are a uniquely enriching pedagogical tool that can
broaden the learning experience. Feminist judgments invite future
lawyers, and indeed any reader, to re-imagine what the law is, what
the law can be, and how to make the law more responsive to the
needs of all people.
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Introduction
(Linda L. Berger, Bridget Crawford, and Kathryn M. Stanchi)
The very idea of re-imagining and rewriting judicial opinions
from a feminist perspective arises from the sense that the original
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judicial opinions did not “do justice” in either process or outcome. 1
Nearly a dozen feminist judgments projects around the world have
addressed this sense of injustice by demonstrating how a
judgment’s reasoning or result (or both) would have been different
if the decision makers had applied feminist perspectives, theories,
and methods.2 Using the resulting re-imagined feminist judgments
in the classroom can help students in a myriad of ways, but
especially in developing their own roles in addressing what they
perceive to be the gaps between law and justice. 3 Reading the
1. See, e.g., Rosemary Hunter, Feminist Judgments as Teaching Resources, 2
OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 47, 56 (2012) (providing overview of feminist judgments
projects’ aims and methods and discussing feminist judgments as pedagogical tools
for cultivating critical-thinking skills in law students).
2. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW
(Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker, & Rosemary Hunter eds., 2014)
[hereinafter AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing Australian feminist
judgments); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter,
Clare McGlynn, & Erika Rackley eds., 2010) [hereinafter ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS] (introducing English and Welsh feminist judgments); FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Loveday Hodson & Troy Lavers eds.,
forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL] (introducing
international feminist judgments); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW
ZEALAND: TE RINO; A TWO-STRANDED ROPE (Elisabeth McDonald, Rhonda Powell,
Māmari Stephens, & Rosemary Hunter., 2017) [hereinafter AOTEAROA NEW
ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing Aotearoa New Zealand feminist
judgments); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, & Bridget J. Crawford eds.,
2016) [hereinafter U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing U.S. feminist
judgments); NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE
GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright, Julie McCandless and Aoifer
O’Donoghue eds., 2017) [hereinafter NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]
(introducing Northern and Irish feminist judgments); SCOTTISH FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS: (RE)CREATING LAW FROM THE OUTSIDE IN (Sharon Cowan, Chloё
Kennedy, Vanessa E. Munro eds., forthcoming Dec. 2019) [hereinafter SCOTTISH
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS] (introducing Scottish feminist judgments); Diana Majury,
Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2006)
(introducing Canadian judgments published in 2008, although dated 2006 because
of a backlog at the journal); see also The African Feminist Judgments Project,
CARDIFF LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, https://www.lawandglobaljustice.com/theafrican-feminist-judgments-project
[https://perma.cc/7P2G-PYJS]
(discussing
feminist judgments projects occurring in Africa); Call for Papers, THE FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS PROJECT: INDIA [hereinafter India Feminist Judgments Project],
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi/call-for-papers
[https://perma.cc/XS4S-3YFU]
(discussing feminist judgments projects occurring in India); Sentencias con
Perspectiva de Género México [Sentences with a Gender Perspective Mexico],
FEMINISMOS GÉNERO Y JUSTICIA (Mar. 15, 2018), https://feminismosgeneroy
justicia.blogspot.com/
[https://perma.cc/HDY4-H2TA]
(discussing
feminist
judgments projects occurring in Mexico).
3. See, e.g., Nathalie Martin, Poverty, Culture and the Bankruptcy Code:
Narratives from the Money Law Clinic, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 203, 238 n.127 (2005)
(conveying students’ frustration at perceived excessive focus on doctrine in the first
year of U.S. legal education and positing that exposure to clinical legal educators
“might help bridge the gap between law and justice, and help integrate theory and
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rewritten feminist judgments introduces students to oftenneglected problems of gender and racial justice, provides templates
and resources for making social justice arguments, and helps
students think critically and creatively.4
As re-imagined and rewritten by the worldwide feminist
judgments projects, the re-envisioned opinions enrich students’
understanding of judicial decision-making. They do so, first, by
comparison with the original opinions because the rewritten
opinions demonstrate that judges, like other human beings, draw
on what has been embedded in their intuitions and reasoning
processes by culture and history, as well as by their own
backgrounds, experiences, and education.5 The feminist judgments
do so, second, by providing the tools for students to understand how
persuasion and explanation work effectively within the significant
conventions and constraints of legal practice. 6
The feminist judgments movement has emerged from an
informal, international collaboration of feminist scholars and
lawyers who decided to use feminist reasoning and methods to write
‘shadow,’ or alternate, judicial opinions. 7 The purpose of the
feminist judgments projects has been to rethink and show what a
difference a feminist perspective can have on legal reasoning and
analysis.8 Although their historical, cultural, and socio-legal
settings differ, the projects share similar methods. 9 Each requires
practice early on.”); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Step Away from the Case Book: A Call for
Balance and Integration in Law School Pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 611
(2008) (arguing that law school pedagogy unduly emphasizes doctrine over skills,
theory, and critical thinking).
4. See infra Part III.B (comments of Kathryn Stanchi).
5. See, e.g., John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial
Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“[I]n
recent years the subject of implicit bias—unconscious or subconscious influences on
decision-making—has reemerged in a variety of psychological and social science
venues and has potentially significant ramifications in judicial decision-making.”).
6. See, e.g., infra Part I.A (comments of Teri McMurtry-Chubb) (teaching
students that narrative and interpretation are used by jurists to frame their
decisions); infra Part I.A (comments of Vanessa Munro) (demonstrating to students
how authorities interpret and apply the law, and the limits of judicial competence).
7. See Majury, supra note 2, at 1, 5, & 7 (describing origins of the first feministrewriting project conducted by a group of Canadian law professors and practicing
attorneys).
8. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, & Bridget J. Crawford,
Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 2, at 3, 5 [hereinafter Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction]
(“Through this project, we hope to show that systemic inequalities are not intrinsic
to law, but rather may be rooted in the subjective (and often unconscious) beliefs and
assumptions of the decision makers.”).
9. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi, Bridget J. Crawford, & Linda L. Berger, The
Necessity of Multi-Stranded Feminist Judicial Opinions, 44 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J.
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contributors to grapple with the facts and law in existence at the
time of the original opinion. All projects share a commitment to
engaging participants who are more diverse and representative of
the country’s population than real-world judges.10
Beginning with the Women’s Court of Canada, this first
organizing group of law professors and activists began their project
in 2004 and published an initial set of six rewritten decisions based
on section 15 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 2008. 11
That collection was followed in 2010 by the English/Welsh
collaboration, which included twenty-three rewritten opinions
originally issued by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal, or the
Privy Council.12 The next published feminist judgments project
came from Australia, encompassing twenty-four opinions from
courts ranging from trial courts to the High Court. 13 The U.S.
feminist judgments project, rewriting twenty-five opinions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, was published in 2016 (with
the three of us as co-editors).14 The Northern/Irish and Aotearoa
New Zealand feminist judgments projects followed in 2017. 15
Feminist Judgments in International Law was published in
September 2019 and the Scottish project will follow soon
thereafter.16 Projects are under way in India, Africa, and Mexico.17
For the most part, participants in the various global feminist
judgment projects have worked independently from the other
projects, although loosely aware of their global counterparts. 18 In
245, 249–53 (2018) (discussing specific historical context of the feminist judgments
project in New Zealand).
10. See, e.g., ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 7–9
(describing importance of producing rewritten opinions that would be plausible to
lawyers and judges and providing an illustration of what difference greater diversity
in the judiciary might make).
11. See Majury, supra note 2 (introducing the purpose, methods, and workproduct of the Women’s Court of Canada).
12. See ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 9–13 (describing
scope of cases and range of courts covered in book).
13. See AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 1, 14–15 (describing
scope of cases and range of courts covered in book).
14. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 8 (explaining
process for selection of twenty-five cases).
15. See AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2;
NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
16. See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2; SCOTTISH FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
17. See The African Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 2; India Feminist
Judgments Project, supra note 2; Sentencias con Perspectiva de Género México
[Sentences with a Gender Perspective Mexico], supra note 2.
18. The exception is Rosemary Hunter; she served as a co-convener of two
projects. See AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2; ENGLISH/WELSH
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May 2017, a group of representatives of several feminist judgments
projects met in person for the first time for a two-day workshop at
the International Institute for Sociology of Law in Oñati, Spain,
convened by the three of us.19 In addition to the ideas generated by
the workshop itself, that meeting in Oñati laid the foundation for
increased communication among scholars worldwide who are
working on feminist judgments.20
As the feminist judgments projects have grown and
developed,21 a small group of faculty members are using feminist
judgments as teaching tools at the undergraduate and graduate
levels.22 We have spoken informally with many people in the United
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
19. See Feminist Judgments: Comparative Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial
Decision Making and Gender Justice, Oñati International Institute for the Sociology
of Law Workshop (May 11–12, 2017), https://onati.wildapricot.org/event-2458799
[https://perma.cc/Z4KS-Y7HX]. Out of that workshop came an issue of the Oñati
Socio-Legal Series of the same name. See also Feminist Judgments: Comparative
Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial Decision Making and Gender Justice, 8 OÑATI
SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1215 (2018) (including an introduction and nine essays from
workshop participants on the methods, impact, and reach of various feminist
judgments projects).
20. See, e.g., @WorldFJScholars, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WorldFJScho
lars/media [https://perma.cc/MX43-GLM8] (“A group Twitter account for anyone
involved as an author or editor in Feminist Judgments projects worldwide.”).
21. For example, Cambridge University Press is publishing a U.S. Feminist
Judgments Series, with individual volumes focused on particular subject matters.
See, e.g., FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS (Bridget J. Crawford &
Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017) (existing as the first subject matter-specific book in
the series). Volumes are forthcoming in the areas of Reproductive Justice, Family
Law, Employment Discrimination Law, Tort Law, Trusts and Estates Law, and
Property Law. See also Series Projects, U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT,
https://law.unlv.edu/us-feminist-judgments/series-projects [https://perma.cc/3D8ZRMFH]. Other subject matter volumes may follow.
22. See infra Parts I–IV; see also Hunter, supra note 1 (reflecting on classroom
use of feminist judgments); Jennifer Koshan, Diana Majury, Carissima Mathen,
Megan Evans Maxwell, & Denise Réaume, Rewriting Equality: The Pedagogical Use
of Women’s Court of Canada Judgments, 4 CAN. LEGAL EDUC. ANN. REV. 121 (2010)
(describing experiences teaching with feminist judgments). In 2012, The Law
Teacher, the U.K.-based journal of the Association of Law Teachers, published a
“Special Issue on the Feminist Judgments Project” including four articles on the use
of feminist judgments in law teaching. See Rosemary Auchmuty, Using Feminist
Judgments in the Property Law Classroom, 46 LAW TCHR. 227 (2012) (describing use
of feminist judgment writing as teaching about the law of co-ownership); Helen Carr
& Nick Dearden, Research-Led Teaching, Vehicular Ideas and the Feminist
Judgments Project, 46 LAW TCHR. 268 (2012) (reporting results of survey of law
teachers about the concept of “research-led” instruction, such as teaching with
feminist judgments, and the need to develop students’ critical thinking skills in
connection with research-led teaching); Anna Grear, Learning Legal Reasoning
While Rejecting the Oxymoronic Status of Feminist Judicial Rationalities: A View
from the Law Classroom, 46 LAW TCHR. 239 (2012) (exploring deployment of feminist
judgments in undergraduate courses devoted to critical reasoning and legal
reasoning); Caroline Hunter & Ben Fitzpatrick, Feminist Judging and Legal Theory,
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States and beyond about using feminist judgments in law school (or
other) classrooms. This essay extends those dialogues in a written
‘conversation’ format that includes multiple colleagues from the
United States, New Zealand, Australia, Scotland, and England. The
purpose of this written conversation is to continue to share
knowledge with each other and future instructors who may want to
teach with feminist judgments. We developed a set of questions
broadly applicable to those who teach with feminist judgments and
asked each conversation participant to choose a small number to
answer.
In Part I, the contributors describe their own experiences
teaching with feminist judgments. In Part II, the participants detail
students’ reactions to working with the feminist judgments. In Part
III, the contributors articulate their pedagogical goals in using
feminist judgments and the intended learning outcomes, in terms
of developing students’ ability to think critically and hone their
advocacy skills. Part IV invites law faculty (and students) to
consider how teaching with feminist judgments could be expanded
or broadened in the future, including the possibility of cross-border
collaborations with students simultaneously undertaking parallel
studies in multiple jurisdictions. Part V discusses feminist
judgments as a blend of activism, pedagogy, and scholarship.
Finally, the conversation concludes by suggesting that more
instructors consider teaching with feminist judgments because of
their positive impact on students’ learning and professional
development.
I. Using Feminist Judgments in the Classroom
A. How have you used one or more of the feminist judgments
as a teaching tool in a classroom or formal pedagogical
setting?
Elisabeth McDonald
As a New Zealand-based criminal law professor, I have
primarily used one of the rewritten judgments, R v. Wang, and
accompanying commentary from Aotearoa New Zealand Feminist
Judgments.23 This decision and the discussion it inspires are
46 LAW TCHR. 255 (2012) (detailing use of feminist judgments in teaching a legal
philosophy course); Rosemary Hunter, Introduction: Feminist Judgments as
Teaching Resources, 46 LAW TCHR. 214 (2012) (introducing methodological
parameters of feminist judgments projects).
23. See Lexie Kirkconnell-Kawana & Alarna Sharratt, Commentary on R v.
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powerful for use in the criminal law course that all New Zealand
law students are required to take. In that course, I teach the case
law, including Wang, and statutory provisions relating to a range of
defenses. I have always taught these defenses by critiquing their
application with reference to the victims and/or survivors of family
violence. The feminist judgment draws on facts from the original
case file that the actual Court of Appeal decision omitted, and those
details really engage the students. The reason for the engagement
is the richness of the facts of the feminist judgment, which provide
extensive background and context for the abuse suffered by Mrs.
Wang.24 These were not present in the appeal decision. 25 The
feminist judgment highlights how the common law can develop in a
way that overlooks, does not recognize, or fails to acknowledge the
experiences of those from different communities and life
experiences. It opens the students up to the notion that judgments
can be criticized and that judges do not necessarily always reach
the most just decision.26
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
We have been teaching from our edited collection, The Critical
Judgments Project: Re-reading Monis v. The Queen,27 for three
years now in Federal Constitutional Law, a compulsory LLB and
JD course at the University of New South Wales in Australia. Ours
is not formally a ‘feminist judgments’ project, but it has related
methodologies and commitments.
In contrast to the plurality of objectives that underpin the
feminist judgments projects, The Critical Judgments Project was
written specifically as a teaching tool.28 The book contains
Wang: Finding a Plausible and Credible Narrative of Self-Defence, in AOTEAROA NEW
ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 497, 497–509. Compare R v. Wang
[1990] 2 NZLR 529 (N.Z.) (affirming criminal manslaughter conviction of victim of
domestic violence who killed her sleeping husband), with Brenda Midson, R v.
Wang—Judgment, in AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2,
at 504 (finding that the jury should have evaluated defendant’s state of mind for
purposes of determining whether self-defense should be considered in manslaughter
case).
24. See Midson, supra note 23.
25. See R v. Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA).
26. See Elisabeth McDonald & Paulette Benton-Greig, Accessing Court Files as
a Feminist Endeavor: Reflections on ‘Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa: Te Rino: A
Two-Stranded Rope’, 8 OÑATI LEGAL SERIES 1241 (2018).
27. See THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT: RE-READING MONIS V. THE QUEEN
(Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2016) [hereinafter CRITICAL JUDGMENTS
PROJECT].
28. See id. at v (introducing law students to various perspectives on a leading
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reimagined critical judgments of a single case, an important one
concerning freedom of political communication decided by the High
Court of Australia: Monis v. The Queen.29 The critical perspectives
covered in the book include a number of feminist critiques, but also
extend the critical project, including perspectives such as a law and
literature, critical race theory, capabilities, political liberalism,
restorative justice, preventative justice, deliberative democratic
theory, and law and economics approach.30 Each theory is
introduced in the book with canonical readings, supplemented, if
necessary, by a short commentary explaining the approach, for
students to first understand the key tenets. 31 The book’s focus on a
single case was also part of its design as a teaching tool. With only
one set of factual circumstances and legal principles to grasp, the
commentaries encourage students to engage more directly and
immediately with the theory presented. Applying different theories
to the same case allows students to more easily identify those
aspects of commonality and difference across the perspectives.
The case of Monis is an ideal vehicle for the book’s teaching
objective. It engages a foundational constitutional law principle
(which Australian students must study in Federal Constitutional
Law) that raises, in tension, multiple values of free speech, freedom
of religion and the desirability of civility in political discourse. 32
Further, it is the first case that split the Australia High Court along
gender lines, bringing to the fore the possible saliency of the identity
of the judges.33
case).
29. See Monis v. The Queen [2013] 249 CLR 92 (Austl.) (‘Monis’).
30. See CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27 (containing an
introductory chapter and fourteen additional chapters, with each additional chapter
presenting a critical perspective that differs in some way from the others in the book).
31. See, e.g., Megan Davis, Intersectional Theory: Where Gender Meets Race,
Ethnicity and Violence, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 103–05
(excerpting Kimberlé Crenshaw’s canonical work on intersectionality). See Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (“Because the intersectional experience is
greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take
intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in
which Black women are subordinated.”); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1241, 1252 (1991) (“Because women of color experience racism in ways not
always the same as those experienced by men of color and sexism in ways not always
parallel to experiences of [W]hite women, antiracism and feminism are limited, even
on their own terms.”).
32. See Monis [2013] 249 CLR 92.
33. See id. (3-3 split decision in which the three male justices found that freedom
of political communication made unconstitutional a criminal prohibition against
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We have adapted The Critical Judgments Project for one class
in a twelve- or ten-week teaching term, with an optional assessment
for students in the final exam. Midway through the course, after
studying the ‘races power’ in the Australian Constitution, 34
students are asked to read Chapter 1 of the book 35 and select a
critical perspective through which they would like to rewrite a
judgment in the races power case of Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth.36
Kartinyeri raises highly contested questions around the role of the
government in protecting culturally important indigenous sites and
the supervisory role of the court in relation to parliamentary choice
under the races power.37
Having chosen a critical perspective from the introduction,
students must then read the chapter in The Critical Judgments
Project on that perspective, and attempt to rewrite the opening
paragraph of one judgment in Kartinyeri.38 Students are then asked
to reflect on a number of questions (which are drawn from the
book).39 Students prepare to discuss these in the upcoming class.
These questions relate to differences in the style, narrative, and
voice of their rewritten judgment, the substantial reasoning and
result of their rewritten judgment, as well as reflecting on the value
of the rewriting exercise.40
As teachers, we prepare for the class by collating the rewritten
opening paragraphs received from students and selecting a number
sending offensive material via the postal service and the female justices found no
constitutional violation).
34. Australian Constitution s 51 (xxvi) (delineating the ‘races power’ provision
allowing the Parliament to make “special laws” for the people of “any race”). See also
Rosalind Dixon & George Williams, Drafting a Replacement for the Races Power in
the Australian Constitution, 25 PUB. L. REV. 83 (2014) (explaining extant
constitutional races power and possible alternatives to it).
35. See Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon, Critical Thinking in Constitutional
Law and Monis v. The Queen, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1,
(providing background to the case, the legal issues the case raises, the book’s
inspiration and organization, and suggestions for how to evaluate each theoretical
perspective presented in the different chapters).
36. See Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth [1998] 195 CLR 337 (Austl.) (‘Hindmarsh
Bridge Case’) (detailing the issue in this case, also called the ‘Hindmarsh Bridge
Case,’ of whether section 51(xxvi), the races power, allowed the Parliament to enact
laws that covered aboriginal peoples).
37. See, e.g., Michael Blakeney, Protecting the Spiritual Beliefs of Indigenous
Peoples—Australian Case Studies, 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 391 (2013) (evaluating
protection for spiritual practices of indigenous people under Australian law).
38. See Hindmarsh Bridge Case, 195 CLR at 337; CRITICAL JUDGMENTS
PROJECT, supra note 27.
39. Appleby & Dixon, supra note 35, at 15 (including such questions as, “Do you
think the [rewritten] judgment results in a more ‘just’ decision than those reached
by the High Court judges in Monis, either in terms of its reasoning or outcome?”).
40. Appleby & Dixon, supra note 35.
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of exemplars to start the in-class discussion. We then guide the
students through each of the exemplars, asking them to reflect on
the tenets of the theoretical approach, and the differences these lead
to in style, reasoning, and results. We also try to generate a
conversation about whether some or all chosen perspectives are in
tension with established legal norms in Australia. We discuss with
students the degree to which some modes of reasoning might
increase support for the court and its jurisprudence from some
sections of the community, while reducing it among others. We also
discuss the relative importance of support for the court from
political and legal elites versus ordinary citizens or disadvantaged
members of the community. Finally, a key part of the exercise is to
get students to reflect on the value of exploring different
perspectives, from the perspective of understanding the
contingency to legal decision-making and judicial choice.
Andrea McArdle
I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments in an advanced fourcredit lawyering seminar called Writing from a Judicial
Perspective, which immerses students in a pending U.S. Supreme
Court case on an issue of public law and ultimately asks them to
produce an opinion deciding it. 41 My course description begins by
asking what we would lose if we no longer had the benefit of a
court’s written analysis of its reasoning. How would litigants and
their advocates gain access to the basis for judicial decisionmaking? What would be the effects on the development of legal
doctrine? Beyond these practical, process-based questions, the
description also asks students how the ‘practice’ of judicial writing
can foreground social-justice perspectives.
After years of teaching the seminar without the benefit of the
feminist judgments projects, I now offer the rewritten opinion model
to encourage reflection specifically on what makes an opinion
justice-serving. This is another way of asking, ‘What makes an
opinion feminist?’42 In framing, scope, and methodology, an opinion
41. See U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
42. The editors of the U.S. Feminist Judgments project specifically took no
position on what constitutes a ‘feminist’ opinion, although they acknowledge their
own views and identify common themes and methods in the feminist judgments. See
Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 3 (“[W]e provided no
guidance to our contributors on what we meant by ‘feminism’ . . . Yet it would be
disingenuous to suggest that we ourselves do not have a particular perspective on
what ‘feminism,’ ‘feminist reasoning,’ or ‘feminist methods’ are. Indeed, without such
a perspective, we would not have undertaken the project.”).
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rewritten through a feminist lens can offer a broad canvas for
exploring questions of substantive and procedural justice. It can
unlock legal and factual narratives that often remain buried within
the opinions that casebooks and commentary enshrine as
‘canonical.’ The feminist judgments I have assigned—to date, five
or six U.S. Feminist Judgments opinions in a semester—are linked
doctrinally or thematically to the U.S. Supreme Court case the class
is excavating. Students thus see multiple exemplars of what an
intentional re-visioning of a judicial opinion might entail. Because
there is no formula, the sheer range of feminist approaches
encourages students to understand the work of opinion writing not
only as a pathway to justice, but also as creative and deeply
rewarding.
Sharon Cowan
I have used feminist judgments from the Scottish Feminist
Judgments Project in my teaching of an undergraduate law course
at the University of Edinburgh called Criminal Law: Harm, Offence
and Criminalization.43 The enrollment is around twenty-five
students. The stand-alone session on feminist judging comes right
at the end of the two-semester course. The timing is not ideal
because students suffer from semester fatigue and pre-exam jitters.
In the future, I aim to integrate feminist judging more fully into
individual sessions as the course progresses. The benefit of doing it
at the end of the course, though, is that the students have already
studied a wide range of topics. I can then offer in one session several
feminist judgments from across those topics. By showing more than
one feminist judgment at a time, it is possible to give more of a sense
of the weight of the whole body of feminist judgments and their
legacy, so it is still an interesting and worthwhile exercise.
Ross Astoria
U.S. Feminist Judgments is one of the texts in my
undergraduate course on Law, Politics, and Society at the
University of Wisconsin-Parkside.44 This course is a sustained
exercise in normative jurisprudence for which feminism provides
the particular normative perspectives. We also use Feminist Legal

43. See SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
44. See U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
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Theory: A Primer45 and Invitation to Law & Society.46 Further, this
course introduces students to the canon of legal sociology, such as
Henry Maine’s Ancient Law,47 Émile Durkheim’s The Division of
Labor in Society,48 and works by Karl Marx49 and Max Weber.50
Each of these social theories posit a different role for law in
constituting a particular social form, and we use the feminist
judgments as ‘data points’ to illustrate and critique these
theoretical perspectives. The feminist rewrites are hence a central
aspect of the course.
When reading a feminist judgment in this course, I prompt
students with a suite of questions. The questions vary depending
upon the material, but the first set revolves around the case’s
internal legal and moral reasoning, contrasted with the original:
What is the doctrinal foundation of the judgment? What is the moral
reasoning of the judgment? How do these differ from the original
decision? Does the holding expand liberty and equality for women
(and others)? Which opinion would you sign on to and why? With
the second grouping of questions, we then use the feminist
judgment to test one or more of the sociological perspectives.
Students deliberate on these questions in small groups and then
report back to the whole class. The questions and conversations
allow students to identify and evaluate how different legal holdings
impact and reflect the organization of society.
For instance, Maine’s theory is that the social form has
“progressed” (his term) from one based upon status to one based
upon contract.51 One of his central examples of this progression is
marriage.52 The class reads the feminist rewrites of Stanley,53
45. See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A
PRIMER (2d ed. 2016).
46. See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF REAL LAW (2d ed. 2016).
47. See HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION TO THE
HISTORY OF EARLY SOCIETY (Pinnacle Press 2017) (1917).
48. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson
trans., Digireads 2013) (1893).
49. E.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, reprinted in
CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 142 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., Wiley-Blackwell
3d ed. 2012) (1845).
50. E.g., Max Weber, The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, reprinted
in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 168 (Richard Swedberg ed. 1999) (1905).
51. See, e.g., MAINE, supra note 47, at 101 (“[T]he movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”) (emphasis in the
original).
52. Id. at 146–90.
53. Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a
state statute that treated an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father, as a
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Frontiero,54 and Loving.55 After comparing their doctrinal
foundations and moral reasoning to the originals, we ask whether
these cases confirm or conflict with Maine’s theory. Students
identify Loving56 as an instance of society’s moving from statuses
assigned by White patriarchy to ones configured around contracts
(reciprocal agreements).
The feminist judgments also play a central role in the final
project. Students either compare and contrast a feminist rewrite
with the original or use the cases (both rewrites and originals) as
examples in support of either a social or philosophical theory. With
respect to the compare and contrast assignment, almost all students
in the course I taught during the last academic year found the
feminist rewrites to be superior. Students disagreed somewhat
more, however, as to whether this was because they were feminist
per se, because the authors were better writers, or because the
authors were released somewhat from various institutional
constraints, such as the compromises sometimes required to form a
majority. Many students, for instance, preferred the moral clarity
of the rewrite of Griswold (no “penumbras”) but thought its
explicitness would disqualify it from securing a majority. 57

“parent,” and so the state must afford both an unmarried woman and an unmarried
man a hearing on parental fitness before taking custody of either’s children), with
Karen Syma Czpanskiy, Rewritten Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois, in U.S. FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 142–45 (reaching same result in a concurring opinion,
but reasoning that only parents who can show that they have willingly assumed
certain parental responsibilities are entitled to a hearing on parental fitness before
the state can take custody of their child).
54. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis a military benefit program that
automatically extended spousal benefits to certain married male military personnel,
but not to married female personnel, absent a showing that the husband was
financially dependent on the military spouse), with Dara Purvis, Rewritten Opinion
in Frontiero v. Richardson, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 173, 175
(reaching same conclusion but “holding that classifications based on sex must be
assessed under strictest judicial scrutiny”).
55. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional a
state-law prohibition on interracial marriage), with Teri McMurtry-Chubb,
Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note
2, at 119–36 (reaching same result but using different reasoning that emphasizes
the historical role of White supremacy and patriarchy in shaping marriage laws).
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 81 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring
unconstitutional a state-law prohibition on contraception by married couples on the
grounds that a right to privacy could be found within the “penumbra” of the various
provisions of the Bill of Rights), with Laura Rosenbury, Rewritten Opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 103–13
(reaching same result but using different reasoning that emphasizes sexual liberty
and equality).
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Kathryn Stanchi
I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments58 in a stand-alone
seminar on judicial opinion writing for social justice at Temple
University Beasley School of Law. I have also used some of the
feminist judgments in independent study and guided research
situations to help students who were writing on issues of social
justice. For example, I assigned Leslie Griffin’s feminist rewrite of
Harris v. McRae59 to a student who was writing a law review note
on the fetal burial laws some states have passed. 60
Teri McMurtry-Chubb
I have used the U.S. Feminist Judgments61 in my Social
Justice Lawyering course at Mercer University School of Law.
Throughout the course, students consider how lawyers and jurists
use judicial narrative and interpretation as tools to support or
oppose existing power structures. Key components of their study are
motion briefs and appellate briefs drafted in foundational social
justice litigation. We dissect each brief through genre analysis,
which serves as our theoretical framework. 62 Genre analysis, the
58. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
59. Compare Harris v. MacRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a ban on the use
of federal funding to provide abortions to Medicaid recipients), with Leslie C. Griffin,
Rewritten Opinion in Harris v. MacRae, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2,
at 247–56 (striking down a ban on the use of federal funding to provide abortions to
Medicaid recipients as violative of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause as well as the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause).
60. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Texas Fetal Burial Law Struck Down in Another
Blow to Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2NfLIft
[https://perma.cc/D99W-Z766] (reporting on Texas federal court’s holding
unconstitutional a law requiring abortion providers and health care facility to
provide burial or cremation of fetal tissue).
61. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
62. See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb
and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text, and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156, 167 n.81
(1999) (arguing that instruction in conventions of legal writing is not the only domain
of legal writing and rhetoric teachers). On the function of genres, see Bret Rappaport,
A Lawyer’s Hidden Persuader: Genre Bias and How it Shapes Legal Texts by
Constraining Writers’ Choices and Influencing Readers’ Perceptions, 22 J.L. & POL’Y
197, 198 (explaining that genres are “a cognitive process of classification that
channel thinking and thereby influence individuals’ communicative actions. Genres
are also central to human communication, understanding, and persuasion.”); see also
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 411, 412 (recognizing importance of understanding cognitive function,
including propensity to categorize items by genre, because “[t]he art of persuasion
requires empathy as well as a deep understanding of human psychology and the
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analysis of a particular type of writing in a discipline, provides us
entrée into how each part of the brief functions to advance each
party’s theory of the case, and into how the U.S. Supreme Court
adopts or rejects a party’s framing and reasoning. Additionally, we
contextualize each social justice case culturally and theoretically.
One of the cases we study is Loving v. Virginia.63 Prior to our
discussion of Loving, I ask the students to read each party’s brief,
the original U.S. Supreme Court opinion, and the rewritten
opinion.64 To open the class discussion about Loving, I provide
students with archival documents contemporaneous to the case to
further immerse them in the world as it was when the case was
litigated. We then turn to a discussion of how each of the litigators
chose to frame the arguments in their briefs, the authorities they
chose to use in crafting the analytical frameworks in their briefs,
possible reasons for their choices, and the scope of materials they
incorporated. Our next endeavor is to evaluate the U.S. Supreme
Court decision along the same axes: how the majority chose to frame
the issues presented by the parties, the authority it chose in crafting
the majority opinion, possible reasons for its choices, and the scope
of materials it incorporated. The feminist judgment for Loving
serves as a point to problematize student thinking about the realm
of what is possible in judicial narrative and interpretation. 65
Susan Appleton
I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments66 in a seminar that I
called Feminist Theories, Feminist Judgments. At my home
institution, Washington University School of Law, every upperlevel student must take at least one seminar. Seminars require
substantial student writing with feedback from the instructor, and
class meetings typically run for two hours per week, although
students earn three credits, with the extra credit merited because
of time and effort devoted to writing. This particular seminar has
multiple purposes: to acquaint students with feminist legal theory,
complex emotional and intellectual processes that result in perception and attitude
change”); see also Karen J. Sneddon, In the Name of God, Amen: Language and Last
Wills and Testaments, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665, 674 (2011) (asserting that genre
analysis “is applicable to legal documents” and applying that methodology to last
wills and testaments).
63. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra note 55,
119–36.
65. See id.
66. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
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to illuminate how to discover and apply such theory in rewritten
opinions, and to emphasize students’ own writing experiences in
drafting opinions and commentary—following the pattern used in
the book. Weekly readings for the seminar come principally from
two sources: Martha Chamallas’s treatise, Introduction to Feminist
Legal Theory,67 and U.S. Feminist Judgments.68
Key elements of the seminar include the following: a few initial
sessions using some introductory materials from both books along
with readings designed to highlight the differences between writing
a scholarly paper or article and a judicial opinion; 69 thereafter,
weekly reading and class discussion of one to three rewritten
opinions along with relevant pages from the Chamallas book; 70 a
guest appearance by the author of one of the rewritten opinions in
U.S. Feminist Judgments to discuss the experience, including
techniques and challenges; and writing requirements, specifically,
a first draft and final version of both a feminist judgment for a case
that the student selects with my approval and a comment on a
classmate’s feminist judgment.
For purposes of the writing assignments, I pair students based
on the subject matter of the cases they choose to rewrite. For
example, in a recent semester I matched two students who chose
cases on domestic violence and two students who chose employment
law cases. Such matching allows students to stay in one substantive
area for both their feminist judgment and their commentary. I
encourage students to be ambitious and not necessarily limit
themselves to cases in which gender might be an explicit issue—
and some of the most fascinating projects have featured cases on
topics such as campaign finance law, eminent domain, and public
employee unions.71
67. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (3d ed.
2013).
68. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
69. To contrast judicial opinions, real and rewritten, with scholarly papers, for
the second or third class meeting of the semester I assign the original, unedited (but
relatively short) opinions in two cases, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), along with Laura Rosenbury’s feminist
rewrite of Griswold, supra note 57, and a scholarly examination of Eisenstadt that I
published. Susan Frelich Appleton, The Forgotten Family Law of Eisenstadt v. Baird,
28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2016). These materials, which include the only ‘real
opinions’ I assign, invite conversation about both the freedom and constraints of the
different genres. In addition, Laura Rosenbury’s rewritten Griswold majority
opinion and my Eisenstadt article exhibit provocative synergies, in part growing out
of the conversations she and I had while working on these projects.
70. CHAMALLAS, supra note 67.
71. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (affirming decision
below by an equally divided court); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
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I taught this seminar for three fall semesters: Fall 2016, Fall
2017, and Fall 2019. Beginning in Fall 2019, I supplemented the
reading with a few excerpts from a new book, Research Handbook
on Feminist Jurisprudence.72 A guest speaker, although still an
option for bringing in new perspectives, has become less essential
for me now that I have my own rewriting experience to recount,
based on my opinion in Dandridge v. Williams, which I prepared for
the forthcoming volume in the U.S. Feminist Judgments Series,
U.S. Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Family Law Cases.73
Separately from the seminar, in a different course, called
Regulating Sex: Historical and Cultural Encounters (which also
emphasizes feminist themes), I have assigned my feminist
judgment in Dandridge v. Williams.74 Beyond these courses, in
several faculty presentations to alumni of my law school (which
recently celebrated the 150th anniversary of its admission of
women),75 I have talked about the various feminist judgments
projects, my use of feminist judgments in teaching, and my
contribution to the Family Law volume in the U.S. Feminist
Judgments Series.76
Troy Lavers
My co-editor Loveday Hodson and I co-teach on an LLM
module at the University of Leicester called Feminist Perspectives
on International Law. We have been using a feminist rewritten
judgment from Feminist Judgments in International Law.77 The
judgment is Bozkurt.78 It is a rewritten version of the famous Lotus
U.S. 310 (2010); Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
72. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Robin West & Cynthia
Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
73. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding
constitutionality of mandatory cap on benefits for families with dependent children,
without regard to family size), with Susan Frelich Appleton, Rewritten Opinion in
Dandridge v. Williams, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN FAMILY LAW OPINIONS
(Rachel Rebouché ed., forthcoming 2020) (holding cap unconstitutional).
74. See Appleton, Rewritten Opinion in Dandridge v. Williams, supra note 73.
75. Karen L. Tokarz, A Tribute to the First Women Law Students, 68 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 1 (1990) (recounting the stories of Phoebe Couzins and Lemma
Barkeloo, the school’s first female law students when they began their studies at
Washington University in 1869); see, e.g., RALPH E. MORROW, WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS: A HISTORY 57 (Tim Fox, Duane Sneddeker, & Herb
Weitman eds., 1996) (“[T]he law school was the first baccalaureate division of the
University to admit women and perhaps the first of its kind in the country to do so.”).
76. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN FAMILY LAW OPINIONS, supra note 73.
77. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2.
78. Case C-434/93, Bozkurt v. Staatsecretaris Van Justitte, 1995 E.C.R. I-1475,
I-1492 (rejecting Turkish national’s right to stay in a European Community state,
even though worker permanently incapacitated while working for Dutch employer).
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case, which gets its name from the Turkish ship involved in a
collision at sea.79 The authors of this judgment are Christine
Chinkin, Gina Heathcote, Emily Jones and Henry Jones.80 We ask
our students to read both judgments and then compare and
contrast. We invite students not only to identify weaknesses and
strengths but also to question whether they feel Bozkurt, the
feminist rewritten judgment, is persuasive and valid. In that sense,
they are judging the rewritten judgment: Is it believable? We chose
this judgment because it is well known by students of international
law and it touches upon foundational issues such as sovereignty and
the power in international relations.81 The feminist rewritten
judgment offers a different perspective on the dispute and rejects
the Western view of state sovereignty.82
Pam Wilkins
I have used U.S. Feminist Judgments83 in a Feminist Legal
Theory course taught during a two-week May intersession at the
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. We read the rewritten
opinions for the various cases about birth control and abortion
(Griswold v. Connecticut,84 Roe v. Wade,85 and Planned Parenthood

79. The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10 (Sept. 7) (allowing Turkey to exercise criminal jurisdiction over officers of French
ship, the S.S. Lotus, that collided with a Turkish ship, the Boz-Kourt, but declining
to address whether Turkey had the right to assert passive personal jurisdiction over
the French officers, finding jurisdiction on other grounds).
80. See Christine Chinkin et al., Bozkurt Case, aka the Lotus Case (France v.
Turkey): Ships that Go Bump in the Night, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 2.
81. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1950 n.48 (2002) (referring to the “famous S.S. Lotus case”).
82. See Chinkin et al., supra note 80.
83. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
84. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting contraceptive use by married individuals,
on the grounds of marital privacy), with Laura A. Rosenbury, Rewritten Opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 57, at 103–13 (reaching same result but using
reasoning grounded in sexual liberty and equality).
85. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring unconstitutional a
state criminal ban on abortion as a violation of the right to privacy under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and establishing a trimester
framework that permits increasing restrictions on a woman’s right to choose an
abortion with each trimester), with Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Rewritten Opinion in
Roe v. Wade, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 151–67 (reaching same
result but grounding opinion in both the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and rejecting both trimester
framework and any restrictions on a woman’s right to choose an abortion).
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey86). We also read the feminist
judgment in Lawrence v. Texas.87 Students are invited to respond to
the opinions in a daily journal entry, and we then discuss the
opinions in class. Given that most students in my Feminist Legal
Theory class have just finished their first year and that
Constitutional Law is a required second-year course at my
institution, most students actually read the feminist judgments for
these cases before they read the actual U.S. Supreme Court
opinions. That makes for very interesting discussion. Several
students have told me that they later reread the feminist judgment
opinions on their own when they covered the cases in their secondyear Constitutional Law course.
Vanessa Munro
I have used the judgment I co-wrote in the English/Welsh
project, R v. Dhaliwal,88 in two different types of classes: first, in a
session on feminist legal methods and theory as part of an optional
undergraduate module on Contemporary Legal Theory at
Nottingham University; and second, in seminars in our compulsory
undergraduate module on Criminal Law at the University of
Warwick (as many know, law is mostly an undergraduate degree in
the U.K.). In both instances, students read the original and feminist
judgments side by side.
In the first instance, the legal theory course, the aim was to
question the universality and inevitability of the conclusions in the
original case, how authorities were interpreted and applied, what
constitutes relevant information and appropriate expertise, and the
extent to which the limits of judicial (as opposed to legislative)
competence is relied upon strategically. We then explored
86. Compare Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding state restrictions on abortion that required, among other
things, a mandatory waiting period and parental notification for minors seeking
abortions), with Lisa R. Pruitt, Rewritten Opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at
365–83 (declaring unconstitutional various restrictions as unreasonable restrictions
on a woman’s interests in liberty and equal protection).
87. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state antisodomy law on privacy grounds), with Ruthann Robson, Rewritten Opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 488–503 (reaching
same result but on grounds of due process and equal protection rights to sexual
autonomy and sexual equality and apologizing for one of the Court’s prior anti-LGBT
decisions).
88. See Vanessa Munro & Sangeeta Shah, Rewritten Opinion in R v. Dhaliwal,
in ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 261–72 (concerning
liability of husband for suicide of wife).
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alternative routes through the process using a feminist approach.
We discussed challenges in securing a ‘better’ outcome in an
individual case without opening floodgates to potentially less
desirable outcomes in other contexts.89
In the second instance, the Criminal Law course, the focus of
the seminar was liability for manslaughter, causation, and
constructive liability. The focus was more on the substance of the
arguments put forward in the feminist judgments, rather than the
methods, and what those illuminated about the broader approach
to judging.
Most recently, as a result of talking with so many people
around Scotland about the Scottish Feminist Judgments Project, I
have some more general teaching experience regarding the overall
project and its aims. We have used the artwork and poetry that
accompany the project in particular as a route for people to become
interested and involved in the project.90 In addition, in Fall 2019,
we undertook a ‘roadshow’ of our project to Scottish universities to
run bespoke sessions on feminist judging with undergraduate
students.
B. Have you had any reactions from colleagues not involved
with Feminist Judgments projects who are curious about
how you are using the work in the classroom?
Ross Astoria
I was recently discussing one of my department’s courses with
the Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies Director and we
realized that my new course should probably be cross-listed.
Feminist judgments might also be of interest to other faculty in the
Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies program.

89. See R v. Dhaliwal [2006] All ER 1139 (EWCA Crim) (Eng.) (deciding whether
an abusive husband could be liable for manslaughter when his wife committed
suicide after a prolonged period of psychological abuse and at a time that pre-dated
coercive control legislation in England and Wales).
90. See, e.g., Artists, SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, https://www
.sfjp.law.ed.ac.uk/artists [https://perma.cc/M3CV-5XQ3] (“This input [of artistic
collaborators] will allow us to explore how non textual and non academic images and
interpretations of legal processes and decisions can help us understand the power
and reach of law, as well as its ethical impact. . . . [T]he artistic outputs . . . engage
a broader and more diverse audience than we could by producing textual resources
alone.”).
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Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
We have now shared our experience teaching with The Critical
Judgments Project91 with our group of teachers in Federal
Constitutional Law, as well as our peers at the University of New
South Wales, and with other teachers in Australia and across the
world. We have had a very positive response from all, including
interest in developing a similar teaching tool in other jurisdictions.
We have had to work closely with our teachers to support them
through the exercise, including providing them with detailed
instructions, and inviting them to sit in on our classes. While
initially skeptical or nervous, their final responses having taught
the courses have always reinforced to us the benefit of the exercise.
For instance, Charlotte Steer, one colleague teaching with the book,
wrote to us after the class:
I feel like we jumped to a whole different level of engagement
with [Federal Constitutional Law]—it made me feel a real sense
of connection with the students and that it truly harnessed
their enormous brainpower—which is not so obvious when they
are struggling to master the content of each class.
....
I also think that deconstructing a judgment so they can write
one of their own . . . is such a marvellous way to introduce them
to the analytical skills we need as practicing lawyers grappling
with the case law.92

Bridget Crawford
At my home institution, Pace Law School (in the United
States), I have had several colleagues say of a particular feminist
judgment, “Oh, that would be interesting to have students read for
my class,” but I am not aware of any of my immediate institutional
colleagues who have used a feminist judgment in a traditional firstyear class. I attribute that to the general pressures of doctrinal
coverage in the first year. Although, I do think that teaching with a
feminist judgment might be a good way of exposing students to
different legal philosophies. Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
do that with multiple perspectives in the Critical Judgments

91. CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27.
92. E-mail from Charlotte Steer, Teaching Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of
New South Wales Law, to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University of New South
Wales Law (Apr. 17, 2018, 16:48 AEST) (on file with the recipient).
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Project.93 By showing that one case can be interpreted through
multiple theoretical lenses, The Critical Judgments Project shows
plainly how theory and philosophy matter, and that there is no one
‘right’ way to approach a case.
II. Student Responses to Feminist Judgments
A. How have students responded to reading a feminist
judgment for the first time? Describe any favorable
reactions and/or challenges students have had or faced.
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
The response we have had from students to the Critical
Judgments Project exercise in Federal Constitutional Law has been
overwhelmingly positive, although mixed across a cohort of up to
450 students in a compulsory course. Some students find the
exercise extremely challenging, as it is often the first time they are
asked to take such an overtly critical engagement with the law. For
instance, Trent Ford, one of our students, was open about his initial
skepticism to “the idea of a ‘critical judgment,’” that it was
“somehow breaching the judicial method, or was undignified, for a
judge to explicitly engage with the sort of references I would use in
my essays.”94 However, having read through the book’s Capabilities
Approach chapter,95 he said, “I realised that the Capabilities were
a useful way of articulating why I already felt that the complainants
deserved protection and that their needs outweighed Monis’
freedom of expression.”96 He would eventually come to see critical
judgment writing as “a very useful tool,” 97 with the potential for
“[improving] the judicial method, by allowing broader consideration
of society and the impacts that the decision could have.” 98 Critical
93. CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27.
94. E-mail from Trent Ford to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, Professors,
University of New South Wales Law (Apr. 26, 2019, 1:49AM AEST) (on file with the
recipient).
95. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 69–70 (2006) (describing the “capabilities approach” as “the
philosophical underpinnings for an account of core human entitlements that should
be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum
of what respect for human dignity requires.”); see Rosalind Dixon, A Capabilities
Approach, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 135–49.
96. E-mail from Trent Ford to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, supra note
94.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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judgment writing also can “upend the orthodox judicial method,” or
simply serve as one of many tentative considerations to be had when
a legalist method “runs out.”99 Thinking of critical judgments in this
way “can make incremental steps to include critical dialogue in real
judgments seem less of an overreach.”100
Other students found the exercise liberating from the start,
having found the strictures of the doctrinal method challenging, but
previously not lacking the tools for understanding these challenges,
or to deconstruct and reconstruct it. For instance, one of our
students, Eloise Kneebone, said:
I was really enthusiastic about the concept. It was the first time
in any of my law classes that feminist theory had not been an
‘other’ theory quietly addressed at the end of a theories class,
as only a critique, and instead put front and centre, as a
theoretical framework that was used to build a judgment and
show the potential of feminism to shape the law.101

Another student, Noah Bedford, expressed genuine excitement
about the exercise:
I believe this excitement was in response to a harsh reality that
I had never been afforded opportunities to develop my legal
education through understandings of myself as an Indigenous
person. That is, understandings of my identity were to date
seemingly irrelevant to the overwhelming focus of my degree–
the application of ‘objective’ legal doctrine. Gebler’s [sic]
judgment encouraged me to contemplate how I could use my
knowledge and experience as an Indigenous legal scholar to
tear away this veneer of legal objectivity, one that has so often
served to sanitise the laws [sic] violent operation on my people.
From here, I could reimagine a new world of Indigenous law
reform.102

Overwhelmingly, we have found that all students across the
cohort have engaged with the exercise with an impressive level of
commitment (this might be related to the fact that we include
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. E-mail from Eloise Kneebone to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon,
Professors, University of New South Wales Law (Apr. 23, 2019, 8:24PM AEST) (on
file with the recipients).
102. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University of New
South Wales Law (Apr. 17, 2019, 2:33AM AEST) (on file with the recipient). “Gebler’s
judgment” refers to Chapter 6 in the Critical Judgments Project. See Katharine
Gelber, Critical Race Theory and the Constitutionality of Hate Speech Regulation, in
CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 88–102.
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participation in the exercise in our overall class participation mark,
and there is an optional exam question related to the exercise). This
level of commitment is demonstrated by Bedford, who indicated
that he approached the class with some concern, but that “my peers
handled some areas of scholarship sensitively.” 103 He also observed
that the critical reflections of other students
provided fascinating insights into how the lived experiences
and ideological positions of my peers interacted with their
interpretations of the law. At the end of the sharing session, I
was overwhelmed with the sense of admiration I had for my
classmates as well the hope I had for future of the legal
profession.104

Sharon Cowan
I give my University of Edinburgh students three feminist
judgments to read alongside the original cases. The cases all deal
with topics we previously discuss in the course: Ruxton v. Lang, a
necessity defense case involving domestic violence; 105 McKearney v.
HMA, a rape case;106 and Drury v. HMA, a murder case involving a
man’s claim of provocation by sexual infidelity on the part of his expartner.107 I ask the students to think about what a feminist legal
method might do to change the reasoning or outcome of the case,
what other sorts of feminist goals we might have in re-judging cases
(such as accessibility of the judgment, and telling the untold
stories), and what makes a judgment feminist. Some of the students
have previously taken courses on gender but many have not. It is
exciting to see how they respond to reading these original and
rewritten cases side by side—particularly the case of Drury,108 since
the law on provocation by sexual infidelity in Scotland is
(incredibly) still in place.
In teaching, I am also able to use other materials—namely,
artistic work—to talk about the importance of feminist judgments
projects. What makes the Scottish Feminist Judgments Project
different from others thus far is its art strand. 109 We engaged eight
103. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 102.
104. Id.
105. Ruxton v. Lang (1998) SCCR 1 (Scot.).
106. McKearney v. HMA (2004) SCCR 251 (Scot.).
107. Drury v. HMA (2001) SLT 1013 (Scot.).
108. Id.
109. But see Julie McCandless, Máiréad Enright & Aoife O’Donohue, Introduction:
Troubling Judgment, in NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 18
(“Of particular import to this project was the engagement of poets and visual and
performance artists.”).
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Scottish artists to respond to individual cases, or the idea of a
feminist judgments project more generally, in their own medium. 110
This has led to wonderful creative work including poetry,
photography, illustrations, a choral work, a filmed theatre piece,
textile sculptures, and a short story.111 I show the class some of this
work to further highlight the difference that perspective makes and
to have a different set of tools to engage them in conversation about
empathy, ethics, and equality. Watching the students understand
the difference that asking questions about perspective can make is
an incredibly satisfying teaching moment!
Troy Lavers
Generally Leicester students’ reactions have been positive to
the comparison of the two judgments and they have commented
favorably on the Bozkurt judgment of the dispute.112 Specifically
students really enjoy the judgment’s discussion on the gendered
nature of the state and of western state sovereignty. Students
always comment on the renaming of the case and the newly founded
renamed Bozkurt principle putting emphasis on state cooperation
in the international system as opposed to state consent.113
They very much enjoy the re-imagining aspect of the case.
However, recently, one of our groups—which was very small
in number—was brutally honest and stated that all participants
found the judgments to be tedious reading and sometimes difficult
to wade through, preferring the use of more plain-speaking articles
that highlighted a point or argument to the use of a judgment. As I
mentioned, this opinion came from a small number of students, but
since these were law students, it was interesting how adverse some
of them were to judgments in general.
Teri McMurtry-Chubb
My feminist judgment for the Loving opinion114 takes my
Mercer students by surprise, because the original U.S. Supreme
Court opinion ‘got it right’ by eliminating barriers to interracial
110. See Artists, SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 90
(describing role of artists in Scottish Feminist Judgments Project).
111. Id.
112. See generally Chinkin, supra note 80.
113. Id.
114. Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra note
55, at 119–36.
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marriage.115 Prior to reading the rewritten opinion, students see no
need for it. They are unprepared for the depth of the feminist
judgment and how it uncovers layers of White supremacy,
patriarchy, and capitalism not addressed by the Court. 116
The rewritten opinion reframes the issue in the Loving opinion
as: “Do laws governing marriage violate the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution when they are based on gender classifications
that serve as a conduit for preferential racial benefits?” 117 My
feminist judgment for the Loving opinion responds in the
affirmative, stating that “such classifications perpetuate invidious
racial discrimination based on [W]hite patriarchal privilege.” 118
Consistently students react to the reframed issue and response with
incredulity, and often explain that their Constitutional Law course
has not challenged them to think about structural, systemic
barriers to legal equality. As we delve deeper into the rewritten
opinion, students express anger and sadness at not being able to
have open discussions in their required law school courses about
White supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism as they relate to
judicial reasoning and interpretation. Most importantly, students
in the class see their experiences as members of marginalized
groups as relevant to resolving heady constitutional issues. They
see themselves and their possibilities in the feminist judgment.
Ross Astoria
In my class at the University of Wisconsin, undergraduate
students’ responses to the feminist judgments have been largely
positive. Some students in the Law, Politics, and Society course are
majoring in the law concentration, but others are philosophers,
sociologists, or general-credit seeking students who have little or no
experience with the law. The law concentration students have read
many of the original opinions, and they largely find the rewrites to
be more doctrinally coherent, to be based upon clearer moral
reasoning, and to have better prose than the originals.
The other students have little experience with legal writing or
legal institutions, but the feminist rewrites seem to be a fairly
gentle introduction. The feminist rewrites’ less convoluted legal
115. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
116. See Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia supra
note 55, at 119–36.
117. Id. at 122.
118. Id. at 122 (alteration added).
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reasoning and more concise connections between doctrine and
holding, make it easier for students to follow. Some of this ease is
because the students find the feminist moral foundation more
intuitive than the moral foundation of the original. A good portion
is because the rewrites can avoid some of the complexity and
compromise that arise in forming a majority coalition of judges. 119
In this respect, the feminist rewrites are an excellent introduction
to legal reasoning. The commentary to each feminist rewrite (which
includes a summary of the original) is absolutely critical to this
group of undergraduate students.
The students at my school hold fairly diverse political beliefs,
and the course was not advertised as one in feminist jurisprudence,
so I was a little worried about the reaction to the course’s ‘feminist’
focus. However, the plurality of feminist perspectives reflected in
the feminist judgments opens a non-dogmatic pedagogical space
that can accommodate such ideological diversity. Feminism turned
out to be an excellent theme for focusing our extended exercise in
normative jurisprudence.
Elisabeth McDonald
It is hard to get a sense of reaction in a class of over 200 to the
requirement that they read an extract from a book that has
‘feminist’ in its title. I am sure that not all the students do read the
assigned judgment and commentary—but there are enough that do,
so that the discussion in class of the new information from the
readings piques the interest of others. Certainly, I see many shiny,
enlivened faces from young women who, after the classes, start to
get a sense of place.
Although a rewritten judgment is clearly a piece of feminist
scholarship, I tend to emphasize that any feminist judgment is also
an exercise in being aware and alive to the possibility of silencing
of the Other that can occur within the criminal justice system, not
only for women. A further significant aspect of the Wang case is that
the defendant was an Asian immigrant woman, who not only
struggled with the language and culture of her new home, but also
with knowing who would actually offer her help and a real
alternative to the violence.120 It was also a case that unfolded in a
119. The editors acknowledge this factor in the introduction to the U.S. Feminist
Judgments. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 9 (“A
major practical difference between this project and real judging is that our authors
were not constrained by the necessity of persuading other justices.”).
120. See R v. Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA).
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suburb of Christchurch, New Zealand, where in March, 2019, there
was a shooting at two local mosques.121 The isolation that Wang
Xiao Jing undoubtedly experienced, we can hope, is not repeated as
we re-evaluate our relationships with our neighbors and fellow
citizens.
Susan Appleton
In my seminar at Washington University in St. Louis, the
students and I undertake a critical analysis of each of the rewritten
opinions that I assign. We discuss what impressed us, what
shortcomings we discovered, and what we might have done
differently. We also speculate about what might have prompted the
authors to write a majority opinion, a concurring opinion, or a
dissenting opinion. We consider the advantages and disadvantages
of each of these options.
Vanessa Munro
On the whole, students have really embraced the feminist
judgments. They have described the judgments as empowering,
challenging, and engaging. Even those who have been more
reluctant, and have pointed to the ‘jumps in logic’ in the feminist
rewrite (as the students saw them), when pushed to do so could
reflect on, and begin to identify, what might also be seen to be jumps
in logic in the original judgment. I think the ways in which stories
are presented and packaged differently in many feminist judgments
have made them particularly powerful teaching tools, even aside
from the issues around legal framing and interpretation.
B. How do the students respond to the idea of a ‘feminist
judgment’—whether the ‘feminist’ part, the ‘judgment’
part, or the entire concept?
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
In Australia, we had some skepticism from students about the
idea of a critical rewriting of a case, either because, as Trent Ford

121. See, e.g., Charlotte Graham-McLay, Death Toll in New Zealand Mosque
Shootings Rises to 51, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2IYHLK7
[https://perma.cc/TW8N-VBWA] (describing aftermath of attacks on New Zealand
mosques).
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explained, it was “somehow breaching the judicial method,” 122 or
because, as Noah Bedford explained, the rewriting must still
“remain[] within the traditional strictures and structures of the
law.”123 This echoes the comments of two of the authors of the
queer/post-structural feminist perspective in The Critical
Judgments Project, Anne MacDuff and Wayne Morgan, that “it is
not really possible to write a ‘queer’ or ‘poststructural’ judgment. It
would either not be ‘queer’, or it would not be a ‘judgment’. It is,
however, possible to write a judgment informed by queer theory and
poststructural feminism.”124
For other students, the writing of the critical judgment was
exactly what gave the exercise its value. For instance, student
Amelia Loughland reflected on reading her rewritten judgment
taking an intersectional lens. She said that this method
was the most enriching way to unsettle the otherwise positivist
conviction of my legal education that there is a ‘correct’ answer
to legal questions. In this way, the exercise helped reinforce just
how deep the (masculine) norm of detached impartiality as the
standard for judicial excellence had been ingrained in my
reading of law. While I had already appreciated this idea from
other critical theory reading, I think the power of the critical
judgment[s] projects is its explicit co-opting of the judgment
format, which forces you to become cognisant of its difference
from what you would expect from a typical judgment.125

Bridget Crawford
Working with something explicitly labeled a ‘feminist’
judgment opens the door to having a conversation about the role of
perspective in judicial decision making. For the most part, I think
students intuit that a judge’s individual perspective or theoretical
commitments inform the way the judge decides the case. Depending
on the stage in their legal education, students may not have the
vocabulary to describe what they see as, for example, a ‘law and
economics perspective’126 or an ‘originalist approach to
122. E-mail from Trent Ford to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, supra note
94.
123. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 102.
124. Anne Macduff & Wayne Morgan, Queer Theory and Poststructuralist
Feminism, in CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27, at 73.
125. E-mail from Amelia Loughland to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University
of New South Wales Law (Apr. 20, 2019, 1:59 AM AEST) (on file with the author).
126. See, e.g., Carole M. Billiet, Formats for Law and Economics in Legal
Scholarship: Views and Wishes from Europe, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1485 (providing an
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constitutional interpretation,’127 but my U.S. students readily
accept the notion that perspective matters and that feminism is just
another perspective. What seems less clear to them is whether a
commitment to feminism leads to a certain result. If my experience
in working on the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project is any guideline,
I would say that there is no such thing as a singular ‘feminist’
approach to decision making (but rather, that there are multiple
ideas that can be drawn from feminisms plural).128 Feminist
judging happens against the backdrop of this discernible body of
feminist legal scholarship, informed by distinct methods and
themes. But a ‘feminist’ perspective does not dictate a particular
result. This is the concept that is more difficult to convey to
students.
Susan Appleton
The students in my classes have reacted positively, but that is
not surprising, given that they chose to enroll in an elective course
with explicit feminist content. They have described the experience
of writing their own feminist judgments as “empowering.”129
Troy Lavers
We share the same experience of positive reviews, probably
because our course has explicit feminist content, like Susan’s. The
overview of ways that law and economics approaches and concepts have been
adopted by European law schools and legal scholars).
127. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
HAS READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019) (describing the historical trajectory
of judicial efforts to translate the U.S. Constitution to contemporary cases). See also
Law to Fact: Prof. Lawrence Lessig Discusses His Book, Fidelity and Constraint, LAW
TO
FACT
(May
14,
2019),
https://www.buzzsprout.com/138309/1131005
[https://perma.cc/ZY55-9VZP] (discussing how judicial interpretation of U.S.
Constitutional rights has evolved).
128. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 3–4 (“[W]hen
we refer to feminist methods or feminist reasoning processes, we mean ‘methods’ and
‘reasoning processes’ plural, all the while acknowledging that there is a rich and
diverse body of scholarship that has flourished under the over-arching label ‘feminist
legal theory.’”).
129. On the course evaluations (which students complete anonymously), one
student in the seminar in Fall 2016 wrote: “I have recommended this class to
multiple classmates for next year. It was well paced and intellectually stimulating.
I often had before and after class discussions with classmates and other law students
about the subject because of the questions posed by the opinions, professor, and
classmates. The papers are demanding, but very interesting. Writing as a judge was
empowering.” Washington University in St. Louis School of Law Instructor Report
for Susan Appleton, FL2016W.W76.829S.01-Feminist Theories, Feminist
Judgments (Appleton) (on file with the author).
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students seem to welcome the presence of a feminist judgment as
another way of using feminist methodology in a ‘real world’
situation, like an actual legal judgment. It seems attractive to
students because it is a practical application of feminist theories
and something they can try for themselves when they choose their
own judgment to rewrite as part of preparation for this particular
class. Not all our students found the task of rewriting their own
judgment to be an experience they enjoyed. Some found it to be a
bit of an uphill climb requiring more reflection than they could
accomplish in a limited time. It might be useful to consider having
the task of judgment writing spread out over a longer period of time
or by groups of students, just as we did it in groups or chambers for
our edited collection.130
III. Pedagogical and Student Development Goals Achieved
with Feminist Judgments
A. What might teaching with feminist judgments accomplish
that is not readily achieved with published, decided cases
or other kinds of typical, traditional legal texts?
Andrea McArdle
Working with feminist judgments can open a door for students
who have come to dis-identify with the substance of law or who feel
alienated and excluded by its formal structures and language. First,
feminist judgments demand more of the law. Because they are
justice-serving, they exemplify what the law is capable of
accomplishing, reaching far beyond, many times, where the law
currently stands. A rewritten feminist judgment demonstrates that
law as presented in casebooks is not inevitable, but often the
product of a judicial author’s choice of analytic framework, limited
openness to considering context, and inclination to adhere to
formalist categories of law. Recognizing that law does present
opportunities to make other choices can be both revelatory and
inspiring to a student who feels disillusioned by law’s inherent
conservatism, but sees in a feminist judgment law’s potential.
Second, feminist judgments’ frequent use of narrative and reliance
on language that is direct, forthright, and accessible can be more

130. See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2 (organizing
contributors to work together in different “chambers”).
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inviting to students who find the forms of law confusing or
unwieldy.
Ruthann Robson’s rewritten Lawrence v. Texas131 is a feminist
judgment that can reach students alienated by the law’s substance
or its form. Substantively, the rewritten version pushes past
prevailing doctrine by centering the concept of sexual autonomy
over the more conventional use of privacy justifications. 132 The
judgment also highlights, and apologizes for, the corrosive human
effects of criminalizing same-sex activity—the law Lawrence
abrogated.133 This willingness to address law’s impact directly and
powerfully shows the potential for law to be more inclusive and
humanizing in its reach and expression.
Pam Wilkins
I think Andrea summed it up well: feminist judgments teach
students that law is neither neutral nor inevitable. Of course, many
students realize law is not neutral, but all too often they do believe
outcomes are inevitable given existing precedent, etc. Students also
fail to see the creative potential within law. I have found that
students who have read feminist judgments begin to see that law,
like so much of our reality, is constructed. As Elisabeth said, this
kind of lesson can be both troubling and liberating. Much of
students’ sense of liberation comes from the realization that they
can—and must—have a voice in constructing law and in shaping
the legal theories and doctrines that will address the pressing
issues of the next hundred or more years. Finally, the realization
that law can be a creative profession comes as a great relief to
students who feel stifled by the traditional law school classroom and
by their early perceptions of legal doctrine.
Susan Appleton
As Andrea and Pam noted, reading and writing feminist
judgments help students to see that nothing in law is inevitable.
Each week that my seminar meets, we enter an ‘alternative
universe’ that becomes as plausible as the one we ordinarily inhabit
131. Ruthann Robson, Rewritten Opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, in U.S. FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 488–503.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 501 (“It is appropriate that we not only overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,
but that we apologize. We regret our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick because its
consequences, both direct and indirect, have been devastating.”).
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in law school and in the legal profession. Put differently, studying
feminist judgments makes clear that every opinion students read in
law school or will encounter thereafter rests on a particular
perspective. For the long term, moreover, some of today’s students
will become tomorrow’s judicial clerks and judges—and they might
well bring to these roles insights gained from studying feminist
judgments.
In addition, I have found that a seminar centered on feminist
judgments offers several advantages compared to seminars built
around the many other topics I have used over the years. First, we
can have much to discuss in class with very manageable reading
assignments. Second, I am now convinced that writing a feminist
judgment (although a ‘fictional’ exercise) offers students an
experience of greater practical value than writing a traditional,
scholarly seminar paper. Finally, the commentaries that the
students produce for my seminar become useful writing samples,
especially when a prospective employer wants something short that
showcases writing style and analytical skills.
Troy Lavers
I agree with Andrea, Pam, and Susan about feminist
judgments’ highlighting the reality of the law not being neutral or
free from being gendered. I would also add that students seem to
enjoy the story of the individual with whom they can identify, and
they are drawn into the issues of context and their own sense of
justice through the story of the individual or group. Whether it is
the right to choose to wear a headscarf, the right to choose one’s
gender identity, or the potential to review a Security Council
resolution, all these examples have a context too often ignored in a
traditional judgment.134 But when examined in a feminist
judgment, the judgment can bring a different perspective on what
the outcome can be. Student engagement with the context of the
legal issues creates a broader legal critique and, as Susan
mentioned, maybe a more feminist judicial clerk or judge in the
future.

134. See Rewritten Opinion in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2; Rewritten Opinion in Christine Goodwin v. the United
Kingdom, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2; and Rewritten
Opinion in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2.
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Elisabeth McDonald
As we all know from re-imagining the law in the way that
rewriting judgments allows us to do, the very powerful message is
that alternative legitimate, thoughtful, well-reasoned decisions
that draw on the available precedent are possible on the same facts.
And the decision can legitimately be the opposite to the original one.
That I think is the key—this is not rewriting with the benefit of new
awareness, better science, or changing social mores—but rather an
exercise that proves a wholly different outcome could have been
reached. That is an immensely significant (and challenging)
message—and is clearly and compellingly delivered by all the
feminist judgments collections. I am sure this is a troubling concept
for very many law students who do not like to contemplate the
option of not just one answer. “What will I write in the exam?” they
wonder. Many will not take this lesson into their other studies and
their careers in the law, or at least not immediately. While it is a
troubling message, it is also a validating and liberating one.
Arguing for changing an existing law or approach, which many
graduates will do in their careers, knowing that there was never
only one position to take, or one answer to a legal issue, is
empowering.
Teri McMurtry-Chubb
As I was drafting my rewritten opinion, the feminist judgment
in Loving,135 for U.S. Feminist Judgments, I was teaching a course
in Critical Race Theory/Critical Race Feminism at Mercer Law
School. One afternoon when I was writing in my office at school, one
of the students knocked on my door for an impromptu meeting. I
asked him to wait while I was finishing up a thought. This
particular student, always intellectually inquisitive, began to read
over my shoulder. The sentences I had written were my reframing
of the issue for the U.S. Supreme Court. When I noticed he was
reading, I turned in my chair to witness his eyes grow wide and his
hand rise to cover his mouth. He said to me “Professor M-C! I had
no idea we could do this!”136 My student is an African-American
male. By “we” he meant African-Americans; by “this,” he meant act
135. See Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra
note 55, at 119–36.
136. See e-mail from David Stokes to Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Professor, UIC John
Marshall Law School & Mercer University School of Law (July 1, 2019, 19:11 EDT)
(on file with the author) (confirming details of interaction in Professor McMurtryChubb’s office).
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as autonomous knowledge producers to push for inclusive inquiry
in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.137
This interaction epitomizes the accomplishment of the
feminist judgment projects. Instead of relegating scholarly and
practical
inquiry
of
White
supremacy,
patriarchy,
heteronormativity, capitalism, and imperialism to upper-division
electives, the projects provide vehicles for integrating the same into
the required law school curriculum. As long as our engagement with
issues about race, class, gender, and sexuality in the law school
curriculum remains separate from the ‘real’ law school classes, our
disjointed approach to teaching about them sends the message that
these issues are tangential and therefore optional in legal
education. The strategies that the projects employ are key to
making social justice a priority for law schools, law students, and
consequently practicing attorneys.
Vanessa Munro
For me, the beauty of teaching with feminist judgments is the
applied and concrete nature of the process. The close reading of the
same case from different perspectives really calls into question the
decisions that are made, the silences, the sleights of hand. These
can be talked about in other texts, of course (and often are), but
there is something about the very applied and specific nature of it
in feminist judgments that really engages students and others.
B. In using feminist judgments in your teaching, what has
been your goal? Do you think you accomplished it? How
do you measure that?
Ross Astoria
As a general matter, I tend to emphasize a set of skills that
one develops with a liberal arts education such as critical thinking,
writing, and synthesis, rather than content knowledge. In the
undergraduate course on Law, Politics, and Society, we use
particular laws and court holdings to start a dialogue with social
theory and normative theory (in this class, feminism). We pay
attention to the structure and tone of writing and think about how
moral language grounds different types of decisions and how that
language resonates or does not resonate with different audiences.
137. See id.
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Students’ final papers suggest that the course refines students’
moral reasoning, attunes them to rhetorical style, and helps them
develop a synoptic perspective on law and society.
Kathryn Stanchi
I have taught several of the rewriting opinions from U.S.
Feminist Judgments in my judicial opinion writing course. We read
the feminist judgment side by side with the original. One of my
explicit goals, described in the syllabus, is to teach students to think
critically about the original decision and how it forms and shapes
our cultural attitudes toward justice. My other goal is to show
students, in judicial language, how an opinion oriented primarily
around social justice looks and sounds. That is, the opinion would
look and sound like a ‘real’ opinion, but advance the law in a way
that students might not have conceived by reading just the original.
It is, of course, hard to measure whether students ‘get it,’ but I think
they do, based on listening to them and reading their own
judgments later.
I watch so many of my students be astonished and heartened
by seeing a judicial opinion written to achieve social justice. I see
them try to do this in their own writing, in a way that I think would
not have been possible without the model of the feminist judgments.
This is particularly important to my students who come from
backgrounds traditionally not represented in the judiciary—for
example, African-American students, students from poor or
working-class families, and students who are members of sexual
minorities. I have had more than one student tell me how freeing,
empowering, and eye-opening it was to see their identities
addressed and respected in legal reasoning. In my view, that
validation alone proves the worth of assigning the feminist
judgments.
With the guided research student, my goal was to show the
student how to make a credible argument that fetal burial laws
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.138 This
was a somewhat unique take on the Hyde Amendment that Leslie
Griffin masterfully articulates in her feminist judgment.139 Reading
138. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). See also
Fernandez, supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing law passed by the
Texas state legislature but invalidated by a federal court that required burial or
cremation of fetal tissue).
139. Leslie C. Griffin, Rewritten Opinion in Harris v. MacRae, in U.S. FEMINIST

38

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38:1

Leslie’s judgment showed me that the Establishment Clause was
underutilized in the context of abortion laws. Leslie’s judgment is
also astonishing in its use of supporting materials to show the clear
religious basis for the law. It was so helpful to the student to see
how Leslie’s arguments were organized, supported, and written.
Bridget Crawford
With the Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions
book,140 my co-editor Tony Infanti and I really wanted to challenge
the notion that statutory interpretation and application are
mechanical exercises. In thinking about whether a particular item
is tax deductible under U.S. law, for example, some items are
crystal clear. A taxpayer may, for example, deduct all “ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred” in carrying on a trade or
business.141 But what exactly is “ordinary”? What is “necessary”?
The statute does not answer these questions.
The same is true with medical expenses. U.S. taxpayers are
allowed in some circumstances to deduct expenses for “medical care
of the taxpayer.”142 But what constitutes “medical care”? In
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, the United States Tax Court took
up that question in the context of gender confirmation surgery and
reached different results than did our colleague David Cruz in his
feminist judgment.143 The feminist judgment uses a radically
different vocabulary even to discuss the basic facts of the case.
David Cruz elegantly begins his feminist judgment with the words,
“Rhiannon O’Donnabhain is a taxpayer.” 144 The original opinion
struggled in deciding what pronouns to use for the taxpayer, even
though the taxpayer herself had been clear in all of her filings. 145
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 247–56.
140. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS, supra note 21.
141. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2017).
142. 26 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2017).
143. Compare O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010), acq., 2011-47 I.R.B.
(permitting some deductions associated with taxpayer’s gender confirmation surgery
and associated transition care, on grounds that the taxpayer suffered from the
“disease” of gender identity disorder, while also stumbling over pronoun usage and
discomfort with discussing transgender issues), with David B. Cruz, Rewritten
Opinion in O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX
OPINIONS, supra note 21, at 274–96 (2017) (permitting all deductions associated with
taxpayer’s gender confirmation surgery and associated transition care, cautiously
adopting the “disease” label in order to secure the taxpayer’s right to a deduction but
writing with noticeable respect for the taxpayer).
144. David B. Cruz, Rewritten Opinion in O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, supra note
143, at 274.
145. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35 n.3 (explaining in a clumsy manner and
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The feminist rewrite does not. Nothing about the way we talk about
the law or make legal decisions—whether the common law or
statutory law—is preordained. Down to the pronouns a judge uses,
there are multiple values-based choices the judge makes.
Pam Wilkins
Frankly, one of my goals in assigning cases from U.S.
Feminist Judgments is simply to be an evangelist for the projects.
Of course, there are sound pedagogical and social justice-related
reasons. I second the comments of Kathryn, Bridget, and Ross. That
being said, one of my principal goals is to let students know about
the global feminist judgments projects. Someday our students will
be lawyers and judges, and as the volumes in the projects increase
(more subjects and more countries),146 there will be a body of
creative scholarship that may inform the arguments they make or
adopt.
C. In your experience, can feminist judgments be a vehicle
for teaching knowledge (i.e., substance and procedure)
and/or expanding students’ understanding of the law?
Or a vehicle for teaching skills (e.g., ascertaining relevant
facts, analyzing and applying relevant facts)? Or both?
Andrea McArdle
Teaching from feminist judgments can increase students’
knowledge base, in the sense that feminist approaches can both
expand their understanding of what unlawful discrimination is—as
a matter of substantive law—and
demonstrate—from an
evidentiary or lawyering standpoint—how discrimination can be
established. For example, Martha Chamallas’s rewritten
concurrence in U.S. Feminist Judgments in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins connects sex stereotyping in the workplace to gender
discrimination actionable under Title VII. 147 It uses expert social
science evidence that was available to the U.S. Supreme Court in
the original case to examine stereotypes. The opinion demonstrates
how stereotypes operate in workplace culture to devalue women’s
‘justifying’ use of a female pronoun in referring to the taxpayer).
146. See supra note 21 (describing forthcoming subject-matter specific volumes in
the U.S. Feminist Judgments Series).
147. See Martha Chamallas, Rewritten Opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 345–60.
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contributions and hinder their advancement in an organization. 148
By making social science central to its reasoning, and focusing on
context (here, workplace practices), this feminist judgment develops
relevant evidence of the day-to-day, insidious ways in which
workplace discrimination often biases assessment of female
employees and keeps women in subordinate positions. Similarly,
Ann Bartow’s dissent in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District effectively uses an expanded factual narrative to reframe a
male high school teacher’s sexual ‘relationship’ with a female
student as sexual abuse and harassment that meets the standard
of sex discrimination actionable under Title IX. 149
Both Martha’s and Ann’s opinions rely on identified feminist
methods (use of social science and narrative) to illuminate the
corrosive realities of sex discrimination, and both would support
learning in classes on civil rights law or sex discrimination. But, in
their attention to facts and context, these approaches point as well
to the lawyering work needed, including fact investigation and
analysis, and fact-based advocacy, to develop and prove the
elements of sex discrimination. So I believe that feminist judgments
also can be helpful in skills-based classes for sensitizing students to
facts and the way facts are used to build cases.
Bridget Crawford
In the tax classroom, feminist judgments can be a vehicle for
teaching both substantive knowledge and the importance of
perspective in statutory interpretation. The case I mentioned
earlier that addresses the deductibility of expenses for gender
confirmation surgery can be read and understood by anyone,
regardless of familiarity with the tax law. 150 And by reading the
case—either the feminist judgment or the original opinion—in
connection with the statute, one can begin to pick apart the prongs
of the statute. “[M]edical care” means amounts paid for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of a disease, or
148. Id.
149. Compare Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (holding
that teenage girl had no cause of action against the school district after being raped
by a teacher repeatedly over a period of two years, on the grounds that the district
had no actual notice of the actions of the teacher), with Ann Bartow, Rewritten
Opinion in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 2, at 430–46 (writing dissenting opinion that would permit recovery to
teenage victim because actual notice standard allows schools to fail to investigate
allegations of teacher crime or misbehavior).
150. See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.

2020]

Teaching with Feminist Judgments

41

for the purposes of affecting any structure of functioning of the
body.151 In rewriting the opinion, David Cruz had to make the
difficult decision of whether he was going to associate the “disease”
label with the transgender taxpayer, and risk pathologizing her in
order to have the payments associated with gender confirmation
surgery qualify as “medical expenses.” 152 So in teaching with the
opinion, one also has the opportunity to look closely at the statutory
language.
Teri McMurtry-Chubb
As Andrea and Bridget said, the feminist judgments serve as
teaching tools for both substance and skills. Each commentary and
opinion provides additional context and nuance for the substance
and procedure in each case. Each also expands students’
understanding of how legal reasoning and analysis are malleable
constructs that can be used in the service of justice. Drafters of the
rewritten opinions play with narrative, point of view, and otherwise
resituate the subject of the opinion. By employing these strategies,
they shift perspective on whom and what is important in the
opinion, as well as on whom and what is at issue. For example, the
feminist rewrite of Loving opinion is, in part, an indictment of
marriage as an exclusive patriarchal structure that perpetuates
White supremacy and capitalism.153 It goes beyond an explanation
of Virginia as a bad actor, an individualist view of race and gender
discrimination, to impugning an institution that is arguably
patriarchal, White supremacist, and capitalist in origin and
tradition.
Likewise, each opinion invites students to reconsider how each
part of a particular genre (in the Loving case, the briefs working
behind the scenes and judicial opinions that address them) advance
a litigator’s theory of the case and oppose seemingly innocuous,
neutral reasoning and analytical structures. By examining how
each rewritten opinion reframes the issues, constructs new
analytical frameworks, and uses those frameworks to build
arguments using facts previously deemed irrelevant, students
151. See 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2017) (defining “medical care”) (alteration
added).
152. David B. Cruz, Rewritten Opinion in O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, supra note
143, at 284 (“Were we assured that transgender persons would be entitled to deduct
from their income the often high expenses that transition care can necessitate, we
would be more moved by the concern not to stigmatize them with an ‘illness’
label . . . But we are not necessarily the last word here.”).
153. Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, supra note
55, at 119–36.

42

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38:1

receive modeling on how to use these same tools in their social
justice advocacy.
Vanessa Munro
Like Andrea, Bridget, and Teri, I think the feminist
judgments are vehicles for teaching substance and skills. Those
things go together. My emphasis is really on each of these
components in turn—so in the theory class, the emphasis was on
methods, and in the criminal law class, it was much more on
substantive concepts.154 But the two obviously cannot be divorced.
It is from the interaction between them that the most powerful
discussions often emerged. So far the reactions to the artwork in the
Scottish project has been really strong.155 This is something that I
intend to use much more in my teaching to get students to think in
different registers about the process of judging, feminist judging,
and feminism.
D. From your perspective, how does becoming acquainted
with the Feminist Judgments projects or any particular
feminist judgment contribute to a student’s professional
formation?
Sharon Cowan
For me, using feminist judgments and the art that has been
created as a response to feminist judgments has a real role to play
in cultivating empathy and a sense of the “ethical imagination” in
students.156 Hopefully they will take this forward into their
professional lives. The judgments and art enable students to see
more clearly the ethical complexities of trying to understand the
whole range of human experience within law, and to understand the
impact of the law in a more grounded way. The judgments and art
encourage students to challenge the supposed neutrality and
objectivity of law, to see the contingent nature of law, and to
undertake their own creative interpretations of law more mindfully.
Being exposed to critical projects such as feminist judgments
projects gives students—and everyone else who engages with them,
including the feminist judges themselves—more tools with which to
154. See supra Part I.A (comments of Vanessa Munro).
155. See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text.
156. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE
OF REFORM IN LIBERAL EDUCATION (1997) (on intersection of ethics and law) and
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW
(2004) (same).
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develop professional and life skills that can make us better lawyers,
teachers, and friends.
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
In the first chapter of The Critical Judgments Project, we
write that students must learn the craft of positivist-based legal
methods, but doing so is not enough.157 We also want students to
graduate from law school with an ability to identify and assess the
influence of personal, social, political, and economic factors in legal
methods, and to interrogate assumptions within legal rules,
institutions, and processes. We emphasize that we want all law
graduates to develop these capacities and that they will all go on to
be intellectual leaders of the community. A capacity for critical
thinking is vital to engage with political and legal institutions and
take the law forward into the future.
In this respect, we are buoyed by the responses of our students
to the exercise. For instance, Ganur Maynard, an Indigenous
student, was skeptical at first about the benefits of the exercise, but
concluded that as a result of the exercise, he found that his
conception of “proper” or “correct” legal analysis necessarily
excludes other perspectives, in the exact manner against which
James Boyd White and Robin West exhort. 158
Maynard suggests that his own reaction may signify “a
broader problem with the practice of law and the legal profession
more generally.”159
Noah Bedford reflected on the value of the exercise to his legal
education with a visual image:

157. Appleby & Dixon, Critical Thinking in Constitutional Law and Monis v. The
Queen, supra note 35, at 1 (“Law school must expose students to the concepts of
indeterminacy and subjectivity in judicial decision-making . . . It must teach
students to identify and assess the influence of personal, social, political and
economic factors in the development of legal doctrine.”).
158. E-mail from Ganur Maynard to Gabrielle Appleby, Professor, University of
New South Wales Law (Apr. 1, 2017, 2:53 AM) (on file with the authors). See also
JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW
33–34 (1985) (“[L]ike any rhetorician, the lawyer must always start by speaking the
language of his or her audience . . . [T]he lawyer’s work has a second essential
element, the creative process . . . . The third aspect of legal rhetoric is what might be
called its ethical or communal character, or its socially constitutive nature.”), and
ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 217 (1997) (“[L]aw and literature scholarship is
often moved by a passion for justice that is explicitly conjoined with a distrust of
dominant, property-obsessed conceptions for virtue. . . .Feminist writing reveals the
same ambivalence.”).
159. E-mail from Ganur Maynard to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 158.
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Instead of swimming around the surface of settled doctrine,
which has been the overwhelming experience during my time
at law school, the critical judgments exercise made me dive deep
into examining how different values and ideologies can inform
what rules ends [sic] up bubbling to the surface. After the
exercise, I felt as though my understanding of the law, a system
that I may well spend the rest of my life participating in, had
truly expanded.160

Student Eloise Kneebone said that the critical judgments
exercise fueled her interest in judges as individuals:
I think the critical judgments exercise gave me an appreciation
of the impact of personal experiences that lie beneath seemingly
objective or neutral judgments, and an appreciation of how the
experiences of a privileged few with similar life experiences has
been very influential in shaping the law.161

Teri McMurtry-Chubb
The tangible existence of a bound, hardcover book titled
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States
Supreme Court (and similar titles from other countries) in a sea of
ubiquitous law school casebooks is not to be underestimated. By
titles like this, students’ suspicions are confirmed that perhaps they
are not receiving a legal education that interrogates inequality. The
feminist judgments projects provide them a path to do so. Legal
education normalizes as ‘neutral’ Western epistemologies—ways of
knowing—that are White, male, and heteronormative. Students
who are social justice minded when they enter law school come into
direct conflict with these ways of knowing, which often results in
their feeling inadequate and demoralized. As Kathryn said, the
feminist judgments projects help students—especially those
marginalized by race, class, gender, and sexuality—to see
themselves in the law school curriculum, body of court
jurisprudence (including the U.S. Supreme Court), and the legal
profession as legitimate sources of knowledge and knowledge
production. The projects reaffirm for students that their
commitment to social justice is possible through the skillset that
they are being taught and reintroduce them to what is possible.

160. E-mail from Noah Bedford to Gabrielle Appleby, supra note 102.
161. E-mail from Eloise Kneebone to Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon, supra
note 101.
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When students see themselves in what they aspire to be, as
reflected in the curriculum, they are empowered to continue boldly
toward their vision for their careers, rather than being discouraged
from pursuing what they envision. The rewritten opinions serve as
a touchstone—a validation of a journey towards justice advocacy. In
studying them, students not only ask questions about their creation
(the impetus for the rewritten opinion), but also about their creators
(the legal scholars who wrote the rewritten opinions), and the
subjects of their creation (the original litigants and their attorneys).
Students’ study of the rewritten opinions normalizes social justice
advocacy by making it accessible.
Kathryn Stanchi
I think this question is so important. It is the critical
foundation of how we see law training. For literally a century, we
have focused on doctrine, doctrine, doctrine. This is so misguided in
my view. Yes, doctrine is important—but who among us would
recommend that newly-minted lawyers give advice to a client, write
a brief, or go to an oral argument solely on the strength of the
doctrine they learned in law school? None of us, I imagine. Lawyers
have to research and update the law, of course. So, why not make
substantial room for critical thinking in law school—not just in
seminars, but in the first year, in those doctrinal core courses? To
me, this is essential to students’ professional development. We need
to graduate students who not only know the basics of the law
(doctrine), but also how to use the law, how to be critical of it, and
how to change it when it needs to be changed. In other words, we
need to teach students not just what the law is, which is so limiting,
but what the law could be; its vast, and largely unrealized, potential
for social change. Too often, I hear students grumble about needing
to know the black-letter law, as if that is all they are in law school
to learn. We are at fault for that grumbling because we are not
adequately communicating to students what it is they need to learn
to be excellent lawyers. To me, feminist judgments are tools that
help us re-envision what law school is and should be.
Another very important part of student professional
development is the ability to communicate with and understand
people of all different backgrounds. We are doing a pretty poor job
of teaching students this essential skill. Those who have the
opportunity to participate in clinics (and choose to do so) are being
taught this critical skill, but this group is usually a fraction of the
students enrolled in (U.S.) law schools. Because legal doctrine, both
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decisional and statutory, represents the perspective of an
exceedingly narrow segment of U.S. society, it is our duty to teach
other perspectives—if for no other reason than our students will
certainly have clients with those perspectives. If you read Clark
Cunningham’s article that likens the lawyer to a translator, 162 you
can see the great divide between doctrine and the lived experience
of so many people whose daily lives depend on lawyers. When
lawyers have no exposure to perspectives other than those of the
creators of the doctrine, lawyers are tone-deaf to their clients’
problems and concerns. Feminist judgments allow students to see
other perspectives on the law, which for many students is truly
showing them another world.
Andrea McArdle
Lawyers in formation need to see demonstrations of law
operating in service of justice, and feminist judgments projects
provide models of an explicitly justice-oriented approach to law. The
disparity between the law as it is and as it could be is sobering, to
echo Kathryn, but also galvanizing. Exposure to feminist judgments
projects gives students a way of thinking about legal institutions—
the potential for judges and legislators to move the law, with
scholar-advocates, such as the feminist judgments authors, pointing
the way. I think exposure to exemplars of how the law can be
imagined and articulated differently is essential for students to
avoid the disillusionment or, worse, cynicism, that can take over
when their sense of the law is limited to a body of rules that seems
unfair and unresponsive to changing needs and circumstances.
Feminist judgments are also powerful reminders of the
importance of taking creative approaches to legal analysis. Asking
oneself, ‘What if the law were different?’—drawing on one of
educator Jenerra Williams’ generative habits of mind 163—is how
fresh perspectives of law begin to take root. Animated by that

162. Clark D. Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992).
163. Jenerra Williams, The Struggle for Justice: U.S. History Through the Eyes of
African Americans, in TEACHING IN THEMES: AN APPROACH TO SCHOOLWIDE
LEARNING, CREATING COMMUNITY, & DIFFERENTIATING INSTRUCTION 61, 62
(Deborah Meier, Matthew Knoester, & Katherine Clunis D’Andrea eds., 2015)
(naming “Evidence, Connections, Viewpoint, Conjecture, Relevance” as the five
“essential habits [of mind] to develop in becoming a true critical thinker and
productive member of a democratic society”). Deriving from educator Deborah
Meier’s inventory of habits, “Conjecture” incorporates this question about “what if.”
Deborah Meier, Democracy at Risk, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, May 2009, at 47, 48.
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question, the feminist judgment authors model creative analyses
that our students can learn from and seek to internalize as part of
their professional mindset.
Further, feminist judgments embody an interdisciplinary
approach to law that legal education generally undervalues. To
guard against a further narrowing of the legal mind, law schools
should encourage (if not require) students to examine how law
works in conjunction with other disciplines. Exposure to feminist
judgments can help students understand law in a broader frame
and to appreciate how access to other domains of knowledge and
theoretical frameworks offers tools to support their work as
lawyers.
Ross Astoria
I think most students tend to get in a routine with the
categories and discourse they use in both everyday life and their
professional careers. I think feminist judgments provide a nice
introduction to alternative modes of thinking about the social world.
My students will be able to transfer this more ‘critical’ point of view
into other aspects of their lives, including their professional careers.
I teach two standard undergraduate courses in constitutional
law: structure and civil liberties. Mostly, I focus in these courses on
mastering the material and legal writing, but part of the craft of law
is recognizing how a decision could have been different, and what
those differences might have meant for the organization of society.
The feminist judgments make demonstrating of these differences
much easier to do. The feminist rewrites of Roe164 and Casey,165 in
particular, are highly effective articulations of alternative
perspectives. I also think the Bradwell/Slaughter-House
combination166 provides a stark and moving contrast to how
different a direction the U.S. Supreme Court might have oriented

164. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
166. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (denying Myra Bradwell admission to
the bar, on the grounds that the right to obtain a law license is not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (holding that
state law creating a monopoly for a single slaughterhouse does not violate Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendment). But see Phyllis Goldfarb, Rewritten Opinion in Bradwell
v. Illinois, in U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 60–77 (finding equal
protection right to obtain law license and distinguishing the Slaughter-House Cases,
because Bradwell, unlike the butchers, otherwise had no right to pursue her
profession).
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the country with its first interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.167
Bridget Crawford
By studying the feminist judgments, students can begin to
evaluate the relative persuasiveness that different arguments have,
even if the arguments are grounded in the same law. Also, some of
the judgments challenge us to think about what ‘counts’ as part of
a legal argument. In Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions,
for example, our colleague Mary Louise Fellows rewrites an iconic
U.S. case involving business deductions. 168 She makes an extended
analogy to the historic distinction between the commercial
marketplace and the private sphere of the home by referring to
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.169 Fellows is not suggesting that
Frankenstein is legal authority, but rather that the story can frame
commerce in a way that is helpful for interpreting and applying the
tax rules that apply to business deductions. I find the analogy to be
incredibly creative—something I would have never considered, but
for encountering the analogy in the feminist judgment.
Also, every time I read any feminist judgment from any
jurisdiction, I am reminded of the importance of providing factual
context and providing enough detail about a client, for example, so
that a court can fully understand the client’s complete humanity.
So often, in tax cases and other areas too, we tend to look at the
‘deal,’ the ‘transaction,’ or the ‘incident.’ But every breach of the law,
every harm, happens in some sort of context. Who the client is
matters very much to how the client experiences that breach. It is
important as lawyers that we continue to present the full stories of
our clients. The narrative and the doctrinal law are important; we
need to master both.
Susan Appleton
Like others, I feel hopeful that we will see the impact in the
years to come, once students who have become acquainted with
feminist judgments take on positions as judicial clerks and possibly

167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
168. Mary Louise Fellows, Rewritten Opinion in Welch v. Helvering, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS, supra note 21, at 103–20.
169. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Bantam Classic 2003) (1818).
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judges, as I said earlier and as echoed by Troy. 170 Beyond that,
however, I think the worldwide reach of the feminist judgments idea
and the significant number of scholars and attorneys who have
contributed to the various volumes reveal that legal feminists have
achieved a ‘critical mass.’ We have become a force to be reckoned
with!
Troy Lavers
I agree with everyone’s points on the importance of teaching
and encouraging our students to critique the law through various
lenses. This is particularly important to us in England and Wales
at the moment, as we will be moving to a different system of legal
qualification brought about by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority
in 2021; students will need to pass a new set of practical exams
before moving onto work experience.171 These new exams will not
require a law degree beforehand, so looking down the road, it may
result in U.K. law schools teaching a much more practical
perspective of law (and less liberal arts-oriented, as an
undergraduate degree). The aim of the change is to diversify the
practice of law and the judiciary, but in the attempt for greater
diversity, I fear a new more doctrinal, practical law degree is what
will emerge. We might be forced to stop teaching feminist
judgments in the wake of competition for law students, and as a
result, we turn to the practical side of law where there is little room
for any valuable critique. Hopefully not, but at this point it is
difficult to see what the future will hold in terms of legal education
for England and Wales.
IV. Teaching with Feminist Judgments in the Future
A. If you have any experience guiding students in writing
their own feminist judgments, what advice would you
have for others making the same assignment?
Andrea McArdle
In my experience, this assignment unfolds in stages. Students
first need to grasp the functions and conventions of judicial writing
170. See supra Part III.A (comments of Troy Lavers).
171. See, e.g., Solicitors Qualifying Examination, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH.,
https://www.sra.org.uk/home/hot-topics/Solicitors-Qualifying-Examination.page
[https://perma.cc/ML3F-GCWP] (explaining practical legal skills component of
Solicitors Qualifying Examination, effective fall 2021).
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(including the attributes of judgment voice). It is authoritative, but
also justifying, explanatory, and analytic. Ultimately, it must be
jurisprudentially persuasive. Students should appreciate (hear) the
contributions of other voices in any judgment—the voices of
concurring and dissenting colleagues, advocates’ voices, and the
written voices of clerks who work closely with judicial authors to
define the scope of an issue and follow the pathways of doctrine. The
judgment writing seminar I teach offers this grounding in judicial
rhetoric and voice and then raises the question of what a feminist
judicial voice is, and how it serves a feminist vision of the law.
Inviting students to compare closely an original and feminist
rewritten judgment also can help them recognize specific ways that
a feminist judgment author responds to the ‘official’ judgment’s
treatment of the law, narrative of the facts, and its interpretive
framework.
It is also helpful to encourage students to identify what they
see as ‘feminist’ in the feminist judgments they read. For example,
a number of my students have absorbed insights about voice,
empathy, elaboration of facts, and a judgment’s attention to the
material and psychic impacts of law on society. Because the course
focuses closely on process and method, students have tended to
concentrate on these manifestations of feminist writing.
We can also prompt students to look for evidence of how a
judgment specifically makes visible, and more central, the
experiences and perspectives of women and other marginalized
members of society. When students begin to see that a range of
perspectives and approaches are compatible with feminism and its
justice-serving aims, they are at least in a good starting position to
tackle writing a feminist judgment.
Ross Astoria
I contemplated an assignment for undergraduates to rewrite
an opinion, but a little reflection made it apparent that learning
law, social theory, and a new normative theory was more than
enough for undergraduates, without also having to learn how to
write like a judge. However, I do think this could make a wonderful
undergraduate senior thesis or independent study project.
Kathryn Stanchi
My advice is to be prepared to do a lot of foundational work on
how to write an opinion, and then do even more work on top of that
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to show how to write a feminist or social justice opinion. One aspect
I really like about using feminist judgments is that it makes the
transfer of skills smoother—students do not have to ‘translate,’
entirely on their own, scholarly articles into judicial language. Such
translation can be difficult because the language of academia can
be quite far removed from law practice language. With the feminist
judgments, students can see the social justice analysis and
reasoning in judicial language. This gives them a good model to
follow. But it is still hard for them. I was teaching mostly third-year
law students in my seminar, and ‘mainstream’ law already had a
firm grip on them. They had already read hundreds of opinions that
contain no feminist or social justice reasoning, as well as many
opinions that explicitly denigrate that reasoning. The students have
been indoctrinated to think that is what law is—and that is all that
law is and can be. It is hard to undo that with a few feminist
opinions, but we can start the process by having them read feminist
judgments and then write their own. The writing process is, of
course, transformative in cementing the use of feminist reasoning,
so I encourage professors to have students write their own feminist
judgments.
The other caveat I would add is to choose carefully the opinions
your students are to rewrite. I tried to choose opinions that had
ample records and plenty of diverse scholarly commentary so that
the students would not have to completely re-invent the wheel. It is
really helpful to have a good number of law review articles as well
as a chapter about the case from one of the volumes in the
Foundation Press Law Stories series.172 The Law Stories help a
great deal in showing the students how many facts were left out of
the original opinion, especially if the original record is not
available.173
Susan Appleton
I would emphasize the importance of case selection. Some
cases lend themselves to feminist rewriting more successfully than
others. For this reason, I am not entirely excited about the
proliferation of new feminist judgments volumes because I will not
let my students choose a case once it has been used for a published

172. See, e.g., Law Stories Series (Paul Caron ed., Foundation Press),
https://subscription.westacademic.com/Search?seriesFilter=22 [https://perma.cc/9W
PR-NB32] (listing thirty-seven subject-matter specific volumes that provide
historical context and a ‘behind-the-scenes’ discussion of details, including some
previously unknown, for well-known U.S. cases in the field).
173. See id.
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feminist judgment. I worry that the U.S. Feminist Judgments
Project, as I have worked with it, is becoming a victim of its own
success, as more and more cases are becoming ‘off limits’ for student
rewriting!
B. What might be some ways to think about teaching with
feminist judgments across borders of subject-matter,
disciplines, nations, and legal traditions?
Teri McMurtry-Chubb
I envision an interdisciplinary, intergenerational space that
welcomes students and professors from graduate programs and
professional schools, as well as members of the community who are
interested in examining and obliterating inequity. In this space,
participants would be encouraged to study the limits of the
jurisprudence that exists for our most pressing social issues, to
imagine what it could be, and to create it. Historically, impact
litigation has incorporated interdisciplinary knowledge to make
legal arguments. Students and scholars from interdisciplinary and
lay backgrounds would operate as a think tank in real time, offering
disciplinary knowledge and perspectives to develop solutions to
societal problems.
Consider, for example, a course called Feminisms. This course
would engage in different conceptualizations of many specialists,
including feminist historians; African diasporic, Asian diasporic,
Latinx, and Indigenous studies scholars; social scientists; scientists;
humanitarians; business, medical, and legal professionals; and the
non-academic/non-professional, childfree, parents, grandparents,
actual and fictive kin networks, and community activists. Feminist
judgments would anchor the course, as well as readings in feminist
and womanist theories.174 Both would be integrated as the
theoretical framework to examine issues in reproductive justice,

174. Writer Alice Walker explains that “Womanist is to feminist as purple to
lavender.” ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS’ GARDENS xii (1983).
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Alice Walker proposed in 1990
that “‘womanism’ provides a contemporary alternative to ‘feminism’ that better
addresses the needs of Black women and women of color more generally. But given
more recent work on trans issues such a gender-specific term would today raise many
more problems than it would solve.” Feminist Philosophy, 2.2 Normative and
Descriptive Components, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (June 28, 2018), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-philosophy [https://perma.cc/55H4-YZBN].
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employment equity, sexual assault and harassment, and career
advancement, among many others.
Ideally, this course would have counterparts in at least three
universities—two in different regions of the United States, and one
in another country. All of the courses would have a common
syllabus. Once a month over the course of a year, the classes would
meet on a visual, digital platform to discuss the readings and
brainstorm strategies. The final projects for the course would be
local and activist in nature. Students would partner with their
communities to address problems that the community members
identify. The class would end with presentations by the course
participants to community stakeholders, and a plan to implement
their social justice reforms.
Bridget Crawford
At least from the perspective of a U.S.-based law teacher, I
would say that our students do not get much exposure to the
substantive law or interpretive traditions of other countries, even
other common law jurisdictions. My (admittedly) limited interaction
with scholars and teachers based in other jurisdictions leaves me
with the impression that Canadian and Australian legal education
is different in that respect. The Canadian and Australian students
(and their teachers) seem to be more conversant with U.S. cases and
legal methods than U.S. students (and their teachers, myself
included) are with Canadian and Australian law.
I do wonder whether the various feminist judgments projects
might be a way to bridge some of those gaps. First, to the extent we
were ever able to coordinate logistically, I think U.S. students would
enjoy being ‘paired’ with counterparts from another jurisdiction. We
might be able to develop an assignment that invites the students to
identify a case in each jurisdiction that addresses a similar issue.
Instead of trying to rewrite the opinions, the students would jointly
read both original opinions. After identifying similarities and
differences (and the reasons for those), the students could work
collaboratively on developing a narrative description of the types of
questions, approaches, or emphases that, if grounded in feminist
jurisprudence, might have changed the result or reasoning in the
case. Students would identify an important text, scholar, line of
thinking, or method in the feminist legal theoretical tradition of
their home jurisdictions and explain how that could apply in both
cases, domestically and across borders.
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The purposes of an assignment like this would be to ask not
only what difference a feminist perspective might make in judicial
opinions, but also to learn about different articulations of feminisms
and the cultural, historical, and political forces that contribute to
shaping the context in which a case arises. This type of course would
be logistically challenging, but could be intellectually enriching for
all involved. And even better if the course could combine with
reciprocal visits by each group of students to the other jurisdiction
and university. Especially in the United States, I think that we need
to expand our jurisprudential view to include greater knowledge of,
and sensitivity for, other legal traditions.
Pam Wilkins
I love this question about borders. My institution is in Detroit,
about one-quarter mile away from the tunnel that separates the
United States and Canada, and we have a dual degree program with
the University of Windsor Faculty of Law, an Ontario law school.
The program allows students to earn both a Canadian law degree
and U.S. law degree in three years.175 Our student body is roughly
40% Canadian, and our faculty also has fairly regular interaction
with our Canadian counterparts. It is absolutely true, as Bridget
said, that the Canadian law faculty and Canadian students are
much more attuned to legal trends and doctrines in other countries.
Any country with a common law heritage is part of the conversation,
and there is also greater awareness of and openness to the legal
perspectives of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, many of my
Canadian students are extremely enthusiastic about the feminist
judgments project.
I see several ways we could teach across national borders with
feminist judgments. One suggestion for the United States and
Canada might be to offer a seminar focused on feminism and
comparative constitutional law.176 As many readers of this dialogue
175. Canadian and American Dual JD Program, DETROIT MERCY LAW,
http://www.law.udmercy.edu/academics/degrees-offered/dual-jd.php
[https://perma.cc/A22W-PZ6L] (detailing school’s joint degree program whereby
students can earn both Canadian and U.S. law degrees in three years).
176. Across a greater distance, Professor Heather Roberts of Australia National
University and Professor Heather Elliott of the University of Alabama Hugh F.
Culverhouse Jr. School of Law engage in a five-week exchange devoted to comparing
jurisprudence of the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of the United
States. See News & Events, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV. COLL. OF L. (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://lawschool.anu.edu.au/news-and-events/news/sweet-home-alabama-studyinglaw-deep-south [https://perma.cc/B2ZN-TMQT] (describing experiences of
Australian students participating in exchange program).
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probably know, Canadian lawyers, academics, and activists have
worked as part of the Women’s Court of Canada project to rewrite
from a feminist perspective the equality jurisprudence of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.177 I can envision a very
rich dialogue that would follow from a class in which students
compare portions of the U.S. Constitution and Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, compare ‘official’ judicial opinions on various
constitutional topics, and then examine the rewritten U.S. and
Canadian feminist opinions and commentary. Comparative
constitutional law, to be sure, but also comparative feminism—
wow!
Troy Lavers
As a teacher of international law, this question about borders
is an easy one. International law crosses boundaries already and
incorporates the issues of individuals and states from around the
world. The teaching of the international feminist judgments means
feminist methodologies can be translated into international
judgments that are accessible to every international lawyer. The
creation and expansion of the numerous feminist judgments
projects around the world in different domestic jurisdictions lends
support to each new project. We are a growing collective.
My co-editor Loveday Hodson and I hope that other
international law projects will emerge. Perhaps phase two of these
projects can be more comparative work.
As international law teachers, we ourselves have not yet
touched upon domestic judgments that discuss international law.
That would make for an interesting perspective on states as well.
Vanessa Munro
One of the great joys of the Scottish Feminist Judgments
Project’s coming after many of the other projects is that we have
been able to feel part of a global conversation. We have really
benefited from the insights and development of pre-existing
projects, each of which speaks in its own distinctive register from
its own unique perspective, but also engages and plays around with
the confines of feminist judging in innovative ways. We have been
particularly inspired in the Scottish project by some of the steps
taken in the Aotearoa New Zealand and Northern/Irish projects to
disrupt certain conventions of mainstream judging. This is what
177. See Majury, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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inspired us to develop the creative strand of the project, and it has
been such a revelation to us throughout! 178
In Edinburgh, in July 2019, we hosted a workshop with
representation from Scottish, African, and Indian Feminist
Judgment Projects,179 building on a post that we did together for the
Social and Legal Studies blog.180 We are really excited to see where
that dialogue takes us.
C. What questions do you have for other people who are
teaching with feminist judgments?
Ross Astoria
I would be grateful for any recommendation on other texts to
accompany the feminist judgments. I use Nancy Levit’s Feminist
Legal Theory,181 Kitty Calavita’s Invitation to Law and Society,182
excerpts from the sociological canon, Silvia Federici’s Caliban and
the Witch,183 and Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s More Work for Mother.184
Most of these are pretty complicated reads for undergraduates, so
any undergraduate-appropriate suggestions are welcome.

178. See, e.g., supra Part II.A (comments of Sharon Cowan) (discussing the
Scottish Feminist Judgments Project engagement with artistic work).
179. Meeting at the Intersections of Feminist Judgments: The Indian, African and
Scottish
FJP
Workshop,
THE
UNIV.
OF
EDINBURGH,
https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/events/meeting-at-the-intersections-offeminist-judgments-the-indian-african-and-scottish-fjp-workshop(0620f33d-94464544-b9d0-433c6c69bc48).html [https://perma.cc/FVP6-ZB5S]. See also Scottish
Feminist Judgments Project – Tour, THE UNIV. OF EDINBURGH, https://www.law
.ed.ac.uk/news-events/events/scottish-feminist-judgment-project-tour-3 [https://pe
rma.cc/R3VA-564C] (listing upcoming workshop dates and explaining the details of
the sessions).
180. Sharon Cowan, Chloe Kennedy, Jill Kennedy-McNeill, Ambreena Manji,
Vanessa Munro, Sibongile Ndashe, Sharifah Sekalalam & Jhuma Sen, Feminist
Judging: From Margin to Centre, SOC. & LEGAL STUD. BLOG, (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://socialandlegalstudies.wordpress.com//2018/11/21/feminist-judging-margincentre/ [https://perma.cc/38EL-NZE3] (exploring commonalities and differences
among Indian, Scottish, and African Feminist Judgments Projects).
181. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 45.
182. CALAVITA, supra note 46.
183. SILVIA FEDERICI, CALIBAN AND THE WITCH: WOMEN, THE BODY AND
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION (2004).
184. RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF
HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE (1983).
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D. Is there a course in which you have not yet used feminist
judgments, but you think there might be some
pedagogical promise for doing so?
Troy Lavers
I use feminist judgments in an LLM module called Feminist
Perspectives on International Law, but I struggle to get colleagues
to agree to add feminism as a topic in the undergraduate LLB
course on international law, perhaps because some on the teaching
team may prioritize a more ‘black-letter’ approach to international
law. Last time I argued for it I was turned down flat. Now that our
collection is published, I have added a feminist judgment to the
reading list for the section I teach, International Criminal Law. I
will try to convince the team to add feminist judgments to their part
of the reading lists. This may be easier to achieve than adding
feminism as a topic.
I think it is really important to expose students to a
representative of feminism methodologies in the mainstream
curriculum. It is inspiring to read how many other people are using
feminist judgments in their teaching, especially large group
teaching. I would love to get feminist judgments integrated into the
majority of the sections of our mainstream course.
Elisabeth McDonald
I am so very keen to use Vuletich v. R, the evidence law
feminist judgment from the Aotearoa New Zealand project which
concerns the admissibility of similar fact or propensity evidence in
a rape case.185 The difficulty is that to understand and properly
engage with the nuanced critique in that decision, students need to
be operating at quite a sophisticated level, which many do not reach,
given the amount of class time and the breadth of material to cover.
It may have to wait for a graduate class.

185. Compare Vuletich v. R [2010] NZCA 102 (N.Z.) (unanimous decision that the
defendant’s alleged sexual offending against another woman on a different occasion
was inadmissible as propensity evidence and the two charges were to be tried
separately) with Carissa Cross, Rewritten Opinion in Vuletich v. R, in AOTEAROA
NEW ZEALAND FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 469–78 (dissenting judgment
asserting that the primary issue at trial was the credibility of both the complainants,
stressing the similarities of both alleged offences, and concluding the charges should
be joined and the propensity evidence cross-admissible).
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I would also very much like to wrestle off one of my colleagues
the consent portion of our criminal law course, so as to use the
rewritten version of R v. Brown.186 It is of concern to me that the
case is still taught to second-year law students in a mostly uncritical
way—and I really wonder how safe they feel reading and discussing
the kinds of pronouncements made by the House of Lords
(regarding sexuality and choice).187 There will be young people for
whom university is their first opportunity to start to feel
comfortable with their own identities and, in my view, we have an
obligation to not only be aware of the impact of the cases we teach,
but to provide a balance to the debate in highly contestable and
personally triggering areas. The reimagined judgment and
beautifully-crafted commentary really are essential additions to
any law school consideration of the Brown case.188
Teri McMurtry-Chubb
My goal is to integrate the feminist judgments projects into
the required (compulsory) legal writing curriculum. The legal
academy is a colonized space that normalizes Western (White)
epistemologies (ways of knowing) and ontologies (ways of being). If
legal educators continue to contextualize legal knowledge in
colonial rhetoric, then students will perpetuate it without the tools
to problematize it.
Starting in the 2018-2019 academic year, in the first-semester
legal writing course at Mercer, I introduced first-year students to
multicultural rhetorics (Indigenous, African and Asian diasporic,

186. Compare R v. Brown [1992] UKHL 7, [1994] 1 AC 212 (Eng.) (dismissing on
policy grounds by a 3-2 vote charges of actual and grievous bodily harm against
members of group of gay men who engaged in consensual sadomasochistic sex over
a period of years, where no police complaint ever filed) with Robin Mackenzie,
Rewritten Opinion in R v. Brown, in ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra
note 2, at 247–54 (reaching same result but for different reasons, notably recognizing
a consent defense in cases of consensual sadomasochistic sexual activity).
187. See, e.g., R v. Brown [1993] 1 AC 212 (HL) 97 Cr. App. 44, 51 (Eng.) (“There
was no evidence to support the assertion that sado-masochist activities are essential
to the happiness of the appellants or any other participants, but the argument would
be acceptable if sado-masochism were only concerned with sex, as the appellants
contend. . . .The evidence discloses that the practices of the appellants were
unpredictably dangerous and degrading to body and mind and were developed with
increasing barbarity and taught to persons whose consents were dubious or
worthless.”).
188. See Mackenzie, supra note 186; Matthew Weait & Rosemary Hunter,
Commentary on R v. Brown, in ENGLISH/WELSH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note
2, at 241.
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and Latinx rhetorics).189 I used these rhetorics as oppositional to the
Western rhetorical discourse that has been taught as ‘neutral’ in
legal writing pedagogy and practice.190 In the future, I plan to
integrate multicultural rhetorics completely into my writing
courses. This will include various opinions from U.S. Feminist
Judgments, as they also serve as oppositional discourse to Western
legal rhetorical practices.191 Ultimately, I wish to center these
rhetorics and teach students how to use them effectively to create
oppositional discourse as they develop various genres necessary for
law practice.
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
We have been speaking to colleagues teaching criminal law
and property law about the value of a critical judgments exercise in
their compulsory courses. We do not think it would be limited to
these areas, and can see the possibility of a dedicated critical
judgments exercise in a much wider range of compulsory courses,
including torts law and corporate law. Indeed, we would like to see
a critical exercise introduced more widely across the curriculum,
and across traditionally public and private areas of law, lest
students gain the (wrong) impression that critical perspectives are
relevant only to certain areas of law.
Bridget Crawford
I generally teach what Alice Abreu has affectionately called
“money-law” courses.192 I am excited about the U.S. Feminist
189. See, e.g., Cynthia Fabrizio Pelak, Teaching and Learning About Settlercolonial Racism: A Case for “Unsettling” Minoritizing and Multicultural Perspectives,
5 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 294 (2019) (discussing anti-racist and decolonizing
teaching methods).
190. The ways that ostensibly neutral rhetoric disguises particular viewpoints has
long been a critique of critical legal scholars. For an early articulation of this view,
see generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). For a critique focused on legal writing and legal
methods pedagogy, see generally Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How
Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices,
103 DICKINSON L. REV. 7 (1998).
191. See, e.g., Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Still Writing at the Master’s Table:
Decolonizing Rhetoric in Legal Writing for a “Woke” Legal Academy, 21 SCHOLAR: ST.
MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 255 (2019) (exploring multicultural rhetorical
practices); Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, The Practical Implications of Unexamined
Assumptions: Disrupting Flawed Legal Arguments to Advance the Cause of Justice,
58 WASHBURN L.J. 531 (2019) (exploring feminist rhetorical practices).
192. See Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: Bringing Money-Law to LatCrit, 78 DENV.
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Judgments Series of subject-matter specific books.193 There is one
in the works for Trusts & Estates and Corporations. The Trusts &
Estates cases seem to be an easy fit for feminist judgments, in some
way, because they involve how we think about families,
relationships, power, and expressions of intimacy. Feminist legal
scholars have been interested historically in all of these topics. But
I think corporate law is ripe for re-envisioning as well. Sure, there
are certain state corporation statutes, but might a feminist judge
articulate a corporate director’s fiduciary duty differently than a
non-feminist judge? Maybe. Maybe not. But it is something I think
about quite often. And we might also understand partnerships,
especially family limited partnerships, differently through feminist
lenses. Limited partnership agreements give rise to so much more
than the legal structure that is captured by the document. They also
can change family dynamics, preserve wealth, and serve as vehicles
for retaining control while involving the next generation of a family
in a business, for example.194 Feminists should be (and hopefully
are) interested in the way that these vehicles operate. 195 There are
questions about equality, equity, sameness and difference, gender,
and power in so many areas of the law.
E. What advice do you have for colleagues who might be
interested in teaching with feminist judgments, but are
not sure where to start?
Bridget Crawford
I would say start small and dive in. Take one case that you
cover in a course, but do not assign it from the casebook. Use an
U.L. REV. 575, 575 n.1 (2001) (“By ‘money-law,’ I mean the areas traditionally viewed
as comprising the business curriculum: tax, corporations, securities, commercial law
(UCC), securities [sic], banking, antitrust and the like.”).
193. See supra note 21.
194. See, e.g., Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Family Limited
Partnerships and Section 2036: Not Such a Good Fit, 42 ACTEC L.J. 253 (2017)
(describing use of family limited partnerships in estate planning); Brad M. Kaplan,
Best Practices in Succession Planning for the Closely-Held Business, in FAMILY AND
BUSINESS SUCCESSION PLANNING STRATEGIES (2009) (explaining how family limited
partnership can play a role in both business and succession planning).
195. See also Geri Stengel, How to Put Your Money Where Your Feminism Is,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 11:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/geristengel/2017
/12/06/how-to-put-your-money-where-your-feminism-is/#5678f16b79fd [https://per
ma.cc/62E5-RVQB] (encouraging women to become active investors, especially
through women-owned vehicles, noting that “[m]any women-owned funds are finding
that women have an increasing interest in becoming limited partners in private
equity funds”).
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unformatted version, perhaps from an online source, and present it
to the students side-by-side with the feminist judgment, also in an
unformatted version. Ask the students to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of each opinion. Ask which opinion gets the law ‘right’
and why. Ask the students whether they can perceive any
theoretical or methodological commitments that undergird the
opinion. It is that simple. This allows us to teach ‘the law,’ in the
sense of the black-letter holding of the case, while also talking about
how decisions get made, how to structure legal arguments, and how
to be most persuasive as advocates.
Elisabeth McDonald
Like Bridget, I would also advocate diving in, but in a selective
way. Choose a case that you might already cover, or one in your area
of interest that has been reimagined. Maybe you will even have a
different rewrite to offer your students—this is part of the learning,
of course. There are many ways to craft a decision that has legal
validity. How you use the case will very much depend on the class—
its size, the age and experience of the students, how much frontloading you will need to do, as Kathryn explained, so that the
participants can understand the significance and value of the
feminist judgment. To get the best pedagogical value from a
feminist judgment, I believe, students have to be working at a level
that they understand the method and are open to engaging with
critical analysis. That said, it is possible, as I have done in my
criminal law class, to focus on an aspect of a judgment to make the
points of significance.
Of course, whatever you do, reading a feminist judgment will
not be appealing to all students as an exercise or as a learning
experience. We know that there are students who are not ready or
willing to embrace legal education as essentially (and importantly)
involving questioning and critique. That should not at all deter you
from diving in. You will, I promise, awake and inspire students who
will then come to accept that advocating for social and legal reform
will be an integral part of their life in the law.
Ross Astoria
For the course Law, Politics, and Society, I wanted to
integrate social theory, normative theory, and law. Feminist
judgments greatly facilitate that integration, but it takes a long
time to design the assignments and readings for undergraduates. If
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you do not have the time to do this, I recommend using individual
feminist judgments to compare and contrast with the originals and
to build that exercise into an undergraduate constitutional law
course.
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
First, read articles like this about teaching with critical
judgments and talk to others who have had experiences teaching
with critical judgments to get an idea of what might work for you.
Second, like Elisabeth said, start with a small exercise (maybe one
class in the teaching term). Do not be afraid that it might fall a bit
flat initially, or that you will have to tweak it, this is always the way
when you start something new that is worthwhile! Third, make sure
you set the students up for it well. Give the students advance
warning, explain the objectives of the activity, make sure your
instructions are clear, and set out your expectations of them in
approaching an often-sensitive exercise. This is often the first time
they are engaging in such an exercise, and they will be feeling
anxious as well. Fourth, have courage that the students will
respond with genuine engagement. That has always been our
experience
E. If you have any publicly available teaching materials that
relate to your teaching use of feminist judgments, where
are the materials accessible?
Kathryn Stanchi
I am happy to share my syllabus for the course in Drafting
Social Justice Judicial Opinions. Just email me!
Teri McMurtry-Chubb
Feel free to DM me on Twitter—@genremixtress—for access
to my teaching materials and assessment tools, and to continue this
conversation.
Ross Astoria
The course attracted quite a large number of students, so I
will be revising it and teaching it again. I would be happy to pass
along the syllabus and other course materials, as well as discuss
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with anyone interested in using this material in an undergraduate
course.
Andrea McArdle
I would be happy to share my syllabus for the course called
Writing from a Judicial Perspective, and the writer’s memo
questions, I ask students to answer about their use of feminist
judgments. I will also be developing a variation of the course that I
plan to launch in Spring 2020, a two-credit seminar focused on
rewriting an opinion (and thus closer in its scope and work product
to the feminist judgments projects). I am envisioning that the class
will work with a final judgment from a federal or state court.
Although the course assignment will not require a feminist
rewriting, we will use U.S. Feminist Judgments196 as a text
providing exemplars of judgments rewritten from a justice-oriented,
feminist perspective. I will encourage students to draw from
feminism or another perspective that is justice-enhancing. I plan to
offer students an additional credit if they take on a judicial-writing
placement during the same semester. I will arrange the placements
and coordinate students’ experience in both components of the class,
to promote reflection on practical applications of classroom
learning.
Gabrielle Appleby and Rosalind Dixon
Our book The Critical Judgments Project197 contains in
Chapter 1 a number of the teaching tools that we draw upon in our
Federal Constitutional Law class in Australia. In addition, we are
developing a Critical Judgments Project website, on which we will
be making available to other teachers our teaching guide for the
class, as well as other materials from feminist judgments and other
critical judgments projects around the world. In the meantime,
certainly email us for a copy of our teaching guide!
Troy Lavers
I am also happy to share our syllabus and reading lists if
anyone would like them. Or, if you would like to comment on
anything included here, please feel free to email me.

196. U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2.
197. CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 27.
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V. Feminist Judgments as a Form of Teaching, Scholarship,
and Service
A. Given the way you use feminist judgments, would you
classify them as a form of legal scholarship, a
pedagogical tool, an exercise in activism, or something
else?
Andrea McArdle
I would say all of the above! As I have used feminist judgments
in my Writing from a Judicial Perspective class at CUNY Law
School, the rewritten opinions are certainly teaching tools. They are
exemplars of intentional judicial writing, resources that students
can draw from as they draft an opinion in the pending U.S. Supreme
Court case we are studying.
These judgments are also engaged scholarship, melding the
conventions of judicial writing and close analysis of law and facts
with a vision of what the law should cover and protect. The
judgments thus embed a scholarly thesis, or claim, that otherwise
might appear in a law review article critiquing existing doctrine or
offering a revised understanding of the law.
The judgments are a form of activism because they apply
pressure to constricted understandings of the social realities that
law should take into account. For example, Laura Rosenbury’s
forthright, feminist version of Griswold v. Connecticut argues for a
broader view of what individual liberty encompasses; because
consensual sexual activity can encourage personal identity
formation and interpersonal relations, laws banning contraception
impede the full experience of personal liberty that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects. 198 Similarly, Val
Vojdik’s expanded equal protection rationale for striking down
Virginia Military Institute’s males-only admissions policy in United
States v. Virginia argues for fundamental changes to the Institute’s
culture of aggressive masculinity and adopts a strict scrutiny
standard for assessing gender classifications. 199 Both measures are
needed to ensure that women are fully incorporated into the
Institute’s program. Because these feminist judgments push back
198. See Rosenbury, supra note 84.
199. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that
males-only admission policy lacked an “exceedingly persuasive justification”) with
Valorie K. Vojdik, Rewritten Opinion in United States v. Virginia, in U.S. FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 389–407 (reaching same result but employing strict
scrutiny for gender-based classifications).
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against societal norms and practices that oppress women, and show
how the law can be a tool for enhancing women’s liberty and
equality, they are activist in intent and effect.
Bridget Crawford
I agree with Andrea. A feminist judgment is a teaching tool,
scholarship, and activism all at once.200 For the person who is
rewriting a case, the judgment is an exercise in legal argumentation
at its core. Using the facts and law in effect at the time of the initial
opinion, how might the feminist judgment writer reach a different
conclusion or use different reasoning to reach the same conclusion
as the original opinion writer? To participate in that process is to
study the law and explain it to others. But feminist judgments do
so by showing, not telling. It is scholarship in an alternate format.
Non-traditional scholarship has not always been eagerly received
by the legal academy.201 I think, for example, of some of the early
criticism launched at work in the critical race theory area.202 But
critical race theory shows us—does not just tell us—that the
language of law is not just the language of traditional law review
articles.203 It can be the language of personal experience, history, or
other narratives.204 So, too, feminist judgments show that judicial
opinions and judicial language can rely on a range of sources, deploy
a wide range of language, explicitly embrace a theoretical lens, and
deploy multiple legal methods in deciding cases.

200. See also Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger,
Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory and Methods Affect the Process of
Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 167, 197 (2017) (“If our work on any of the Feminist
Judgments projects contributes to solving problems of gender equality and advancing
justice, we gladly embrace the multiple labels of scholars, activists, and educators.”).
201. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REV. 893, 907 (2015) (discussing negative reactions to critical race theory writing).
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–48
(1991) (recounting her personal experience renting an apartment in New York with
that of a white male colleague to illustrate how the presence or absence of a written
rental contract can take on different meanings, based on the relative power positions,
including those linked to race, gender, and historical practices of the contracting
parties).
204. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 201, at 899–902 (surveying different forms of
critical race theory writing).
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Vanessa Munro
I agree with Andrea and Bridget. To my mind, rewriting
judicial opinions from a feminist perspective is a combination of a
teaching tool, scholarship, and activism—or at least it has this
potential. The feminist judgments have the capacity to be of interest
to policy-makers, judges, and practitioners (even if only out of
curiosity); to make students understand and challenge legal
methods and concepts; to promote reflection on feminist approaches
and gender equality; and to agitate for change by raising public
consciousness (e.g., through art exhibitions but also through things
like our coverage in mainstream media).
Conclusion
(Linda L. Berger, Bridget J. Crawford, and Kathryn M. Stanchi)
At law schools and in undergraduate courses in the United
States and law schools internationally, professors are using
feminist judgments in seminars, courses in brief and opinion
writing, jurisprudence courses, and subject-matter specific courses
such as tax and criminal law.205 Other instructors may want to
experience for themselves the benefits that are obtained from using
feminist judgments in the classroom. First and foremost, by reading
the alternative judgments in comparison with the original
judgments, students learn more about the use of language and how
variations in word choice and style affect writers and readers.206
Through reading the feminist judgments, students encounter voices
and aspects of history that are often neglected. 207 They see how
other writers have transformed theory into practice and how
experienced brief writers have pursued their own social justice
goals.208 Especially in courses where students write all or part of
their own alternative judgments, students begin to understand how
they may participate in crafting persuasive arguments using a
range of sources.209

205. See supra Part I.A.
206. See, e.g., LINDA L. BERGER & KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL PERSUASION: A
RHETORICAL APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE 6 (2017) (“The key to rhetorical situation
analysis is to precisely identify the trigger or prompt for the advocacy. Different
prompts evoke different audiences and impose different constraints on the rhetorical
response.”).
207. See supra Part II.
208. See supra Part II.
209. See supra Part II.
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In addition, using feminist judgments in the classroom
introduces students to feminist theory and feminist history,
illustrates the application of theory to practice in the form of the
rewritten judicial opinions, helps students recognize the obstacles
posed to social justice activism by precedent, and exposes the
contingency of judicial decision-making by helping students see that
the original opinions were often only one option.210 The feminist
judgments highlight techniques of persuasion while illuminating
constraints on opinion writing. They provide models for writing
opinions and briefs that apply feminist and critical theory and
methods to social justice contexts. In this way, familiarity with
feminist judgments expands student understanding of available
legal theories and demonstrates the use of feminist methods such
as practical reasoning and narrative. Finally, they illustrate the
power of comparative learning by encouraging students to contrast
opinions decided from different perspectives as well as from
different jurisdictions.211
For all of these reasons, feminist judgments are unique
teaching tools that can accomplish multiple goals through a
seemingly simple exercise of comparing an original opinion with one
rewritten using all of the same facts and law, but coming to a
different conclusion (or reaching the same conclusion for different
reasons).212 We are excited about using feminist judgments in the
classroom and hope that teachers from all levels—secondary
education, colleges, law schools, and other graduate and
professional programs—will experiment with different ways of
teaching and learning. There is a global community waiting to
assist and support anyone who would like to try.

210. See supra Parts II and III.
211. See supra Parts II and III.
212. See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford, Introduction, supra note 8, at 9 (explaining
that opinion authors “could draw only on facts and law in existence at the time of the
original opinion” and that authors “were free to choose to write a majority opinion, a
dissent, or a concurrence, depending on their goals”). Of the twenty-five opinions in
the book, the eight re-imagined majority opinions were roughly evenly divided
between those that changed the ruling and that those that changed the reasoning
only. Id.

